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Network congestion is still a major problem in multi-serviced heterogeneous wireless 
networks (HWNs), despite the installation of more macro and micro base stations and the 
deployment of more efficient Radio Access Technologies (RATs) such as 3G and LTE. 
Congestion is caused by the increasing number of subscribers, ground-breaking technologies in 
the smart-mobile world and advent of new user-friendly applications. As users utilize the 
resource-constrained network, they crave to increase their Quality of Service (QoS) and monetary 
utility. This is a challenge for Service Providers (SPs) because they must ensure an effective and 
efficient delivery of services while reducing operational cost and increasing profit. On the other 
hand, the revenue generated by an operator depends on the number of successful calls made by 
users and this translates to higher profits for the operator. In an attempt to solve the problem of 
congestion and efficient utilization of radio resources for revenue enhancement, an economic 
approach that integrates a collaborative pricing scheme to the conventional call admission control 
(CAC) will be viable.  
When the demand for radio resources becomes excessive, the provisioned capacity of the 
network reaches the congestion stage, which may lead to high level of new call blocking and 
handoff call dropping probability figures that are undesirable. On the other hand, when there is a 
low demand for radio resources, the capacity is underutilized and this result to wastage of 
resources. However, operators do not desire underutilization as well as the congestion stages of 
the network resources. These extreme levels of utilization can be avoided by developing an 
intelligent dynamic pricing scheme, which is named the collaborative dynamic pricing scheme.  
Service providers, (or operators) employ pricing schemes to help provide desired QoS to 
subscribers and to maintain profitability among competitors. An economically efficient pricing 
scheme, which will seamlessly integrate users’ preferences as well as service providers’ 
preferences, is therefore needed. Else, pricing schemes can be viewed as promoting social 
unfairness in the dynamically priced network. However, earlier investigations have shown that 
the existing dynamic pricing schemes do not consider the users’ willingness to pay (WTP) before 
the price of services is determined. WTP is the amount a user is willing to pay based on the 
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worth attached to the service requested. There are different WTP levels for different subscribers 
due to the differences in the value attached to the services requested and demographics. 
This research has addressed congestion control in the heterogeneous wireless network 
(HWN) by developing a dynamic pricing scheme that efficiently incentivises users to utilize 
radio resources. The proposed Collaborative Dynamic Pricing Scheme (CDPS), which identifies 
the users and operators’ preference in determining the price of services, uses an intelligent 
approach for controlling congestion and enhancing both the users’ and operators’ utility. Thus, 
the CDPS addresses the congestion problem by firstly obtaining the users WTP from users’ 
historical response to price changes and incorporating the WTP factor to evaluate the service 
price. Secondly, it uses a reinforcement learning technique to illustrate how a price policy can be 
obtained for the enhancement of both users and operators’ utility, as total utility reward obtained 
increases towards a defined ‘goal state’.   
The performance of the proposed CDPS is evaluated using MATLAB simulation tool, 
and the simulations are analysed for different demand level scenarios. The relevant performance 
metrics considered are call blocking and call dropping probabilities, network utilization and, 
users and operators’ utility. Simulation results show that the proposed CDPS reduced congestion 
in HWNs, and enhanced users’ and operator’s utility by efficiently incentivizing users to make 
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Chapter 1  
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
The telecommunications industry has evolved over the years with astonishing growth in the 
market, due to developments and technological advancements, it has also coped with the 
unprecedented increase in the number of subscribers. The continuous growth in mobile 
broadband demand from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) world 
telecommunication and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) indicators database 
released in 2013, shows that mobile broadband subscriptions grew from 268 million in 2007 to 
2.1 billion in 2013, this translates to a 40% increase in annual growth [1]. An unprecedented 
increase was recorded in developing countries, which more than doubled between the years, 2011 
and 2013, from 427 million to 1.16 billion and exceeded those in developed world. Africa being 
the region with the highest growth rates over the past three years, witnessed an increase in mobile 
broadband penetration from 2% in 2010 to 11% in 2013.  The figures keep surging with higher 
demand for diverse services on the network. The driving key-words for the evolving paradigm of 
wireless communication (called the Next Generation Wireless Networks (NGWN)) are 
optimization, harmonization and integration of networks and services [2].  
With this rapid growth rate, the telecommunication industries continue to introduce 
innovative ways of handling this growth by providing more efficient technological mechanisms. 
The number of subscribers craving for high bandwidth consuming services has led to the 
innovation of more efficient telecommunication paradigm. The possibility of realizing the 
‘connected everywhere, anytime, anyhow’ philosophy which is aimed at meeting subscribers 
demand will require economically efficient business models, intelligent technological prowess 
and innovative implementations.  
The evolution of the telecommunication core and access network is motivated by the need 
to meet the demand of the market. Users are becoming more technologically driven with a rising 
demand for more efficient and satisfying ways of interacting with the network. This evolutional 
trend coined the phrase ‘next generation’, a phrase used to describe the features or expectations 
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of the capabilities of envisioned telecommunication network. As evolution unfolds, the 
telecommunication industries ensure that they meet up with users demand and provide the state 
of the art technology, which improves the overall users’ Quality of Experience (QoE). The 
evolution in network technology is such that the recently developed RAT aims at mitigating the 
shortcoming of the previously deployed one. As a result, capacity is enhanced in the 
telecommunication network. For example, the Internet Protocol (IP) creates prospects for using 
packet switching for voice, data and video on the 4G technology specifications, which is an 
enhancement on the previous lower generations of network, such as the 2G, 3G and 3.5G RATs.  
The telecommunication paradigm keeps evolving, with greater sophistication envisaged. The 
evolution proceeded from the fixed mobile line, which is circuit switched, to the IP based next 
generation networks and then the future internet of things called the post-IP paradigm [3], which 
have received much attention recently.  
The concept of the Heterogeneous Wireless Networks (HWN) was developed to improve 
efficiency, by integrating the capability of RATs from different generations. Heterogeneous 
wireless network consists of multiple RATs coexisting in the same geographical location, and 
supporting multiple services (calls) such as voice, video and data. Network heterogeneity 
introduced a new paradigm to the network orientation and architecture. In cooperative 
heterogeneous wireless networks (HWN), radio resources of multiple RATs are jointly managed 
for enhanced quality of service (QoS) provisioning and improved radio resource utilization. It is 
assumed that the resources are available in a ‘pool’ which is managed by the Joint Radio 
Resource Management (JRRM) or the Common Radio Resource Management (CRRM) schemes. 
The HWN creates more room for users to explore the combined capabilities of the individual 
RATs.  
In a telecommunication network, when the demand for radio resource reaches the 
provisioned capacity, poor quality of service may be experienced in the network and further call 
requests will be rejected, which can be referred to as congestion. Congestion is still a major 
problem in HWN, despite the installation of more macro and micro base stations and deployment 
of more efficient radio access technologies such as the 3G and LTE. Congestion is due to 
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increase in number of subscribers using the network and increase in bandwidth demand per 
subscriber, as more subscribers use high bandwidth-consuming services.   
Over the years, the mobile network market has grown to be highly competitive. A mobile 
network service provider or operator needs a good marketing strategy to stay in business or risk 
losing customers to competitors. A service provider that ensures its subscribers have a higher 
degree of satisfaction than that of its competitors will always take the leading edge in the 
telecommunication market. Therefore, network operators are looking for means to ensure that 
network resources are optimally utilized, users’ utility is enhanced and revenue is maximized.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
The increase in demand for radio resources is due to the advent of new user terminals 
capable of running mobile applications that consumes high bandwidth and increase in number of 
subscribers in the wireless networks. This increase in number of subscribers running high 
bandwidth consuming applications creates a major challenge in managing the provisioned 
capacity of the radio access technologies. When the RATs available on the telecommunication 
network are oversubscribed, congestion will occur in the network. Congestion leads to degrading 
of QoS provisioned because more users contend for the limited radio resources available. 
In a bid to control the demand, available services on the network are priced dynamically. 
Users’ sensitivity to price enables the control of usage by regulating service price as the radio 
resources are being utilized. However, pricing network services to limit users’ demand for 
network access may be viewed as socially unfair by users if it is not done intelligently to consider 
users’ response to price, thereby adversely affecting the revenue of operators. ITU indicators of 
2013 show a decline in revenue even as network capacity increases. This creates a problem and 
motivates a revolutionary pricing scheme that will forestall decrease in operators’ revenue. It is 
consequently important to develop pricing schemes that controls congestion and take into 
cognizance the enhancement of users and operators’ utilities. The proposed scheme therefore 
mitigates this problem by ensuring prices of services are done in an efficient way.    
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1.2 Objective of Research 
 The objective of this research is to develop a collaborative mechanism for managing the 
network resources for the enhancement of both users and operators’ utility. The network resource 
of interest for this research is basic bandwidth unit for different classes of service. Example of 
users’ utility are monetary and QoS utilities, while operators’ utility can be in terms of radio 
resource utilization and revenue.  Using a dynamic economic approach, congestion in the 
network can be controlled by introducing an incentive in form of price adjustments, to ensure 
that users limit their consumption of radio resources during peak period and consume more when 
the network is underutilized. Network users are price sensitive. Hence pricing can be used to 
address congestion issues especially during the peak period. An economic approach can 
drastically reduce congestion problem in HWNs.  
  The specific objectives of this research are to: 
• Develop a collaborative dynamic pricing scheme that will enhance users and operators’ 
utilities 
• Evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in a heterogeneous wireless network 
• Investigate users’ sensitivity to dynamic pricing using the utility function 
• Investigate the effect of the proposed scheme on congestion control 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this work is to numerically simulate the performance of the 
proposed collaborative dynamic pricing scheme using MATLAB tool. A Reinforcement Learning 
(RL) algorithm is incorporated to illustrate a reward-driven price policy that takes into 
cognizance users and operators’ preferences for service price evaluation. 
An analytical model is developed for the proposed pricing scheme in a HWN using the 
Markov Decision Process (MDP). The developed model has different utilization levels and 
associated reward. It also incorporates users’ willingness to pay, which is obtained from a 
demand function and a table of preference that describes users and operators’ utilities. Four 
utilization levels (states) are chosen based on network load and demand. The preference table, 
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which gives the utility of both users and operators at different utilization levels, is formulated. 
The ‘goal state’ is marked on the preference table as the state that enhances the utility of both 
users and the operator.  
The Q-Learning algorithm is introduced to illustrate the service price determination based 
on total utility reward. The Q-Learning uses the preference table to collaborate the users and 
operators’ preferences, as utilization level changes. The aim is to ensure that the users are 
motivated to make call requests that will drive the network to the ‘goal state’ with time, 
consequently controlling congestion and enhancing both users’ utility and network operators’ 
utility.   
 The performance is evaluated considering blocking and dropping probabilities, users’ 
utility and operators’ revenue. 
1.4 Scope of Research 
This research focuses on development of a collaborative dynamic pricing scheme for 
controlling congestion in an HWN by incorporating users’ WTP in determining optimal 
congestion price of network services.  It uses a demand model to determine users’ arrival rate 
into the network as a function of price.  
The demand function is somewhat limited due to the different user behavior available in 
the network. Some users will make any call request irrespective of the price at any time. This 
introduces a shortcoming to the use of demand model to determine user’s WTP. Therefore, we 
assume that reasonable percentage of users will make connection request or have sufficient WTP 
as price and network utilization changes. 
Finally, in a scenario where different SPs adopt different pricing policies, there will be 
pricing complications. Therefore, this research only considered the performance of the proposed 






1.5 Research Contributions 
  The contributions of this work are as follows:  
1. Development of a collaborative dynamic pricing scheme for controlling congestion in the 
HWN by obtaining an optimal price policy that will efficiently incentivise enough number 
of users to utilize the network resources in an effective manner. 
2. Incorporation of users’ willingness to pay in the collaborative dynamic pricing scheme 
which dynamically determines service prices in the network and thereby drive the network 
utilization to a goal state.  
3. Investigation of users’ price sensitivity to dynamic pricing using the utility function.  
1.6 Peer-reviewed publication 
Some of the author’s contributions are contained in the following peer-reviewed publication: 
Samson O. Orimolade and Olabisi Falowo, “Congestion Control in Multi-Serviced 
Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Using Dynamic Pricing (with Users’ Willingness to Pay 
Incorporation)”, proceedings of Southern African Telecommunications Networks and 
Applications Conference (SATNAC), The Boardwalk, Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape, South 
Africa, 31st August - 3rd September, 2014. 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 gives a general overview of Heterogeneous Wireless Networks (HWN) and 
radio resource management in NGWN. The features of the global vision of radio resource 
management are presented and the approaches to decision making in network selection are also 
presented. The effect of congestion in Heterogeneous wireless networks and its inherent 
challenges are discussed. Furthermore, existing methods of controlling congestion in HWN in the 
literature are reviewed. The telecommunication markets shifts, strategies and pricing schemes are 
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equally discussed. Finally, related work on congestion control in heterogeneous wireless 
networks are reviewed. 
Chapter 3 presents the proposed scheme analysis. The HWN model and utilization 
conditions are described.  Approach to modelling users’ willingness to pay is presented. A 
flowchart for the proposed dynamic pricing scheme is presented and the incorporated RAT 
selection algorithm is explained. The Q-learning method is modelled to suit the characteristics of 
the HWN. Finally, relevant performance metrics is introduced to evaluate the efficiency of the 
proposed scheme.  
Chapter 4 gives the requirement and limitation of the evaluation framework. This 
chapter describes the preference table that aids the evaluation of the associated reward obtained 
as the price of service changes with utilization. The goal state which enhances both users’ and 
operators’ utility, as utilization and service price changes is also described. Finally, utilization 
state scenarios are chosen to achieve the envisaged performance of the proposed pricing scheme.  
Chapter 5 presents the numerical simulation results and examples to demonstrate the 
efficiency of the proposed scheme. The MATLAB simulation tool is used in evaluating the 
scheme. The performance of the proposed pricing scheme (CDPS) is examined for congestion 
control and utility enhancement. The total utility reward is presented showing how price policy 
converges to a goal state most of the time. Lastly, results showing users and operators’ utility 
enhancement is presented. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusion and recommendations of this research. Highlights of 






2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The radio resources available on wireless networks require efficient utilization, which is 
the objective of the Radio Resource Management (RRM) schemes. The advent of Heterogeneous 
wireless networks (HWNs) has further diversified the inherent challenges of the RRM in 
telecommunications. The HWN which is a feature of the beyond 3G framework, has introduced 
more sophisticated technological solutions, due to the heterogeneity of users, services, Quality of 
Service (QoS) requirements and what not. Therefore, in a heterogeneous wireless network, RRM 
techniques require more advanced solutions to meet up with the evolving demand.  
The utilization of radio resources by subscribers on the network determines the condition 
of the network.  Users requests for diverse services, with different QoS attributes, without any 
knowledge of the network condition at the time. Also, users aim to maximize their utilities as 
they utilize the radio resources ‘selfishly’ [4]. This overall behavior creates a challenge which 
impedes the efficient utilization of the radio resources, despite the technological advancements in 
the base stations’ architecture and capabilities. An economic approach is proposed to control this 
behavior, given that users are sensitive to price.  The pricing schemes approach introduces an 
incentive to the network usage. A dynamic pricing scheme can be employed to incentivize users 
to limit their consumption during peak periods of utilization and are encouraged to use the 
network during low utilization periods. This ‘use-control’ is achieved by increasing and reducing 
prices based on network load conditions.   
2.1 Overview of Heterogeneous Wireless Networks (HWN) 
Heterogeneous wireless networks (HWNs) can simply be defined as the interworking of 
different radio access technologies having a pool of resources, which is jointly managed. The 
RATs include 2G, 3G, WiFi, LTE deployed in macro, micro, femto cells and so on, with each 
constituting RAT having different capacities and physical characteristics [5]. A HWN is assumed 
to have a pool of resources belonging to coexisting RATs, which is commonly managed for an 
efficient radio resource utilization. The Figure 2.1 illustrates a heterogeneous network, consisting 
2G, 3G, WIFI, LTE access networks.  The RATs have different capacities and capabilities, 
ideally under the control of a single control entity known as the Common Radio Resource 
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Figure 2-1: Heterogeneous Wireless network illustration 
The HWN shown above provides a wide range of possibilities and functionalities to 
subscribers, leading to a higher aggregate in capacity and better QoS for users. The increasing 
demand for high bandwidth-consuming applications creates congestion in the heterogeneous 
networks, despite the higher aggregated capacity available in HWN. The trend in the 
telecommunication over the years is that demand always meets up with capacity, thereby posing a 
challenge of matching demand and capacity efficiently. Heterogeneity in the network introduces 
dynamism arising from multiple dimensions such as propagation conditions, traffic generation 
conditions, interference conditions etc. Therefore, the dynamic network evolution calls for 
dynamic management of radio resources resulting from the multiple number of parameters that 
needs to be analysed.  
HWN provides numerous advantages compared to the homogeneous networks and 
provides benefit to end users and operators as well. The following are the advantages provided by 
the HWN: 
a. HWN provides wider range of capabilities, services and quality than what a single 
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RAT (homogeneous network) can provide. 
b. Users are presented with a wider range of alternatives as they roam the HWN. Multi-
mode users can connect to the RAT that suit their requested service.  
c. Network operators running HWN can generate higher revenue by exploiting the 
properties of each individual RAT. 
d. Network operators have better opportunity to explore business aspect of the 
telecommunication networks. Efficient pricing schemes can be developed to attract 
more users to make connections.  
Table 2.1 shows an example of RATs that can coexist in HWN with diverse 
characteristics in terms of bandwidth, coverage, and application [6]. 
Table 2-1: Wireless technologies characterised by data rate, range and application 
Class Technology Data rate Range Application 












































Synchronization and transmission of 
video/audio 
WMAN 802.16 WiMAX 70Mbps 50km Metropolitan area broadband internet 
 
It is worth mentioning that HWNs have gained wide attention today, as they support 
diverse mobile terminals such as smartphones, phablets and tablets. Some of the mobile 
terminals enable users to connect multiple radio interfaces, which include but not limited to 
GSM, 3G, WiMAX, LTE, WLAN and Bluetooth. 
2.2 Radio Resource Management in NGWN 
Radio resource management strategies enable efficient utilization of the air interface 
resources in the radio access network. The strategies adopted in managing the scarce radio 
resources need to be highly optimized to avoid congestion and underutilization. As the 
telecommunication technologies evolve, the RRM strategies have significantly evolved from the 
context of single RAT developments, which corresponds to the 2G, 2.5G and 3G to a jointly 
managed radio resources of coupled networks, termed the heterogeneous wireless networks, 
HWN (or the next generation networks). 
 In the next generation wireless networks, the common RRM (CRRM) is responsible for 
the efficient management of the pool of radio resources made available by the combined RATs. 
The idea of the CRRM is based on pool of radio resources, belonging to different RATs, but 
commonly managed. Emerging technologies require the development of CRRM algorithms for 
the seamless operation of each RATs available on the network. The participating RATs in the 
HWN is based on specific multiple access mechanism exploiting in turn different orthogonal 
dimensions, such as frequency, time and code. Furthermore, each overlapping RAT is 
characterized in terms of coverage, operational cost and Quality of Service capabilities.   
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The coexistence of different RATs necessitates the common Radio Resource 
Management (CRRM) for enhanced QoS provisioning and efficient radio resource utilization [7]. 
They are aimed at maintaining QoS and at large, the quality of experience (QoE) of users. The 
Call Admission Control (CAC) and Pricing schemes are two of the Joint RRM algorithms. 
Generally, there are two types of QoS requirements of a call namely packet-level QoS 
requirements and Connection-level QoS. The CAC is sufficient in improving packet level QoS 
(in terms of packet delay, average throughput, jitter and packet loss probability) of ongoing 
connections especially during congestion period. However, CAC is not efficient in improving 
connection level QoS (in terms of new call blocking and hand off call dropping probabilities) in 
that it does not provide incentives for users to use shared resources efficiently [8]. The current 
CAC schemes cannot avoid congestion because they do not provide incentives for users to use 
channel resources effectively. Therefore, new call blocking and hand-off call dropping 
probabilities reach high levels during congestion.  
The major aim of jointly managing radio resources by the CRRM is to achieve an 
optimum solution in terms of throughput, cost per packet, development and deployment cost [2]. 
The operation of the CRRM for this work will adopt a policy-based approach. A policy is a group 
of rules or criteria that guides the network behaviour based on operators preferential parameters. 
The policy-based approach enables the operators to modify the CRRM entity for optimizing the 
functionalities to the degree allowed by the coupling mechanism. With the policy-based 
approach, operators are able to deploy and correlate business strategies with the overall network 
actions [2].   
The interconnection as well as the interworking of these RATs is made possible through 
the core network or the backbone networks. Users terminals having multi-interfaces can now 
connect to different wireless technologies available. An outstanding property of the HWN is in 
harnessing the best features of each individual network, providing wider range of services and 
quality than a single entity of homogeneous network.  
On the other hand, operators have more opportunity to maximize their revenue through 
provisioning of a HWN. The revenue can be maximized when a pricing scheme that enhances the 
efficient utilization of resources is implemented. 
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In the HWN, local RRM entities perform some decisions inherently in the individual 
RATs, while the CRRM makes a joint decision based on the locally made decisions. The level of 
interaction between the local RRM entities and the CRRM may vary depending on the policy 
adopted or the degree of optimization. There are different possibilities of implementation of 
CRRM procedures in the HWN. Figure 2.2 shows a low level of interaction, where the CRRM 
only decides the policy to be adopted in the RRM operations. All RRM measures such as RAT 
selection algorithms, Hand over algorithms, Admission control, Congestion control, scheduling 
and power control are handled by the local RRM entity.  
 
Figure 2-2: Low-level interaction between the CRRM and RRM functions [2] 
For a highly sophisticated HWN, the configuration in Figure 2.2 above is not efficient 
enough because the low interaction between the CRRM and the local RRM entity is limited to 
the policy specification and update, which occurs on a long-term scale thereby posing a 
drawback. Higher levels of interactions are achievable which only limit the responsibility of the 
local RRM entity to power control. The Figure 2.3 shows the configuration where all RRM 
measurements are jointly controlled by the CRRM. The efficiency of the network is therefore 
enhanced in terms of response time, where a frequent RAT selection can be performed for a 
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given terminal within the shortest time. Thus, the CRRM also handles congestion control to 
avoid overload situations in the access networks. 
 
Figure 2-3: High level of interaction between the CRRM and RRM functions [2] 
The next section presents the global vision of radio resource management, giving details 
on the high level of interaction between the network user and the network. 
2.2.1 Global Vision of Radio Resource Management 
The global vision of resource management in the HWN is a highly interactive mechanism 
which integrates the user and the network seamlessly. The NGWN, which introduced the ‘user 
centric’ paradigm, is depicted in Figure 2.4 below showing the convergent point of users and the 
network, with network operators continuously engineering their technological prowess.  
An efficient framework for HWN involves the following procedures and functionalities: 
Resource (information) monitoring, Decision making and Decision enforcement. The interaction 
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between the users and the network can be seen in Figure 2.4. Decision making is mainly 
dependent on resource monitoring and decision enforcement.   
Decision Making
(Network selection for user and /or operator, BW allocation for operator)





























Quality degrades caused 
















Figure 2-4: Global vision of resource management in HWN [6] 
The procedures involved in efficient management of the resources can be explained in the 
following [6]: 
a. Resource monitoring: This is the information gathering phase, whereby the 
information is obtained either from the users, the networks or both. This information 
is considered as an input for making decisions that enhances the use of the available 
radio resources. Resource monitoring is done before and after a connection is 
established. The first monitoring phase is for the purpose of initial network selection 
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and bandwidth allocation. In an event of call request, if the network is unable to 
allocate bandwidth to the user based on the class of request, the user is advised to 
modify the request (application adaptation), else user will wait by returning to 
resource monitoring mode, and until network condition is favorable for the requested 
call. The second monitoring is for the purpose of observing an ongoing connection in 
the occurrence of undesirable events such as user mobility or congestion. Network 
modification will therefore take place due to mobility or network congestion.  
b. Decision making: Decision making can either be based on the network operators’ 
preferences or at the users’ preferences, referred to as network-centric approach and 
user-centric approach respectively. Collaborative decision making is also possible, 
called the collaborative approach. The major focus for this research on the HWN is 
inclined towards the collaborative approach which encourages the equal participation 
of the ‘two parties’ in making any decision.  
c. Decision enforcement: This is the execution phase of the management procedures. It 
ensures that the connection request to a selected network is successful. On an event of 
unavailability of connection, it will go back to the monitoring stage and wait for a 
favorable condition. This occurs when the network refuses a call request in order not 
to violate the commitment made to ongoing calls. In network-centric approaches, 
network selection is enforced using admission control mechanisms to filter or direct 
access to networks according to the decision made in previous step.  
2.3 Decision Making Mechanism in Network Selection  
Decisions can be made through a network-centric approach or user-centric approach or 
both, depending on who is making the decision. An efficient HWN environment requires a 
decision mechanism that does not only integrate the network and the users, but also collaborate 
the objective of both, in making or arriving at a decision. According to who is benefiting from a 
decision, the scheme proposed in [6] classifies the solution into three approaches: network 
centric, user-centric, and collaborative approaches.   
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2.3.1 Network-Centric Approach:  
This approach makes decisions solely on the network conditions and network operator’s 
profit even though some mechanism may also take into consideration user’s requirements before 
making decision. Schemes in this approach deal with how network can optimize its bandwidth 
and thus, making the bandwidth allocation problem the main concern. The following are 
examples of network centric based schemes;  
-  Stochastic programming scheme in some literature addresses the joint resource 
management, in which user bandwidth is provided by several access networks in 
HWNs. However, it only supports a single common service with fixed required 
bandwidth which is not appropriate for a HWN characterized by variety of services 
along with differentiated bandwidth.  
- Game theoretic schemes places the success of individuals on the choices made by 
other participating agents. The objective is to ensure each network offers maximum 
bandwidth as available and increase revenue obtained by new connections. The scheme 
in [9] present a game theoretic scheme within cloud service providers that compete for 
cloud users. They aim to obtain an optimal price for each cloud service provider that 
best corresponds to their service qualities and yet remain attractive to cloud users.  
- The utility function schemes is the satisfaction derived from the requested service. 
The scheme in [10] proposes a utility-based dynamic pricing scheme for improving 
network operators’ revenue. Users’ utility (satisfaction) can translate to the QoE of the 
subscriber. For this research, the user and operator utility function is used to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed scheme. 
2.3.2 User-Centric Approach:  
Decisions are made at user terminals and they are based only on user’s profit without 
considering network load balancing or other users. This is majorly a network selection problem, 
with the objective of finding the most profitable network for user’s application. Users are only 
concerned about maximizing their utilities, not bordered about the network condition, thus 
leading to congestion and quality degradation of ongoing network users. On occasions whereby 
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the network block users due to one reason or the other, users will have to process the call request 
again, thereby resulting in higher energy consumption. The following are examples of user 
centric techniques for decision making; 
- Analytical hierarchy process and grey relational analysis; An Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) is employed for objective criteria weighting. An order preference 
technique based on Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) is then applied to rank the 
evaluation alternatives. AHP and GRA are techniques employed in Multiple-Attribute 
Decision Making (MADM), which involves making preference decisions (e.g. 
evaluation, prioritization, selection) over the available alternatives that are 
characterized by multiple, usually conflicting attributes.  
- Consumer surplus; In economics, the consumer surplus is the amount that consumers 
benefit by being able to purchase a product for a price that is less than what they 
would be willing to pay. Today’s HWN characterized by real-time multimedia 
application cannot be efficiently managed by this scheme, because it is designed for 
non-real-time multimedia applications. However, the concept consumer surplus 
remains interesting as it can also be exploited using different parameters in real time 
multimedia applications available in the HWNs.    
2.3.3 Collaborative Approach:  
This approach is considered to be the most compromising in terms of profit because it 
takes into consideration the maximization of utilities and revenue of users and operators 
respectively. It can be considered as the integration of both the user-centric and network-centric 
approaches, discussed earlier. The users’ preference is weighted along with the operators’ 
preference, then an equilibrium is obtained through iterative measures with the objective of 
controlling congestion and enhancing users’ utility and operators’ revenue. This is the major 
focus of this research. More details on techniques employed in reaching users and operators 
utility and revenue enhancement respectively, are in upcoming chapters.   
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Heterogeneous wireless network environment requires a decision mechanism solution that 
will not only provide access to the users, but also collaborate the preference of both provider and 
the user, in making or arriving at a decision. According to who is benefiting from a decision, K 
Piamrat et al in [6], classify the solution into three approaches: network centric, user-centric, and 
collaborative approaches.    
The telecommunication market has experienced remarkable shifts and strategies from 
business plans to technological advancements as evolution continues. Previous disconnected 
systems are now integrated and this thereby continuously transform the Operation Support 
Systems (OSS) and Billing Support System (BSS) environments [11]. The features of the HWN 
and various users demand drive the transformation of the OSS and BSS.  
Pricing a network is an important aspect of the network management, which determines the 
revenue obtained by the operator and how the users perceive the network. Network service 
providers adopt price policies, which enable them to obtain revenue for services provided. 
Pricing of the network services may differ among operators, though offering same services. 
Users’ price sensitivity plays a major role in attracting users to a particular network and on the 
other hand, the network QoS guarantee is also important. Users aim to maximize both QoS and 
monetary utilities as they crave for the network resources [12]. 
In economic terms, the telecommunications market can be referred to as an oligopolistic 
market. An oligopolistic market describes a scenario where few sellers sell to many buyers. The 
sellers here represent the network operators and buyers are the users. This creates a competitive 
platform between operators, where the operator perceived to offer the best prices and QoS 
guarantee, has more users. An intelligent marketing strategy for an operator will be to consider 
what users perceive about rate of calls in comparison to their competitors. Different operators 
may adopt different pricing policy. Policy entails outlined rules of how the usage of radio 
resources should be billed. Due to the ever-evolving telecommunication market and competition, 
policies should not be static, therefore a dynamic pricing policy is suitable. For example, a 
software based programmable dynamic pricing scheme provides flexibility to operators to modify 
price policies implemented on the network, to meet up with diverse users demand and to enhance 
profitability [13]. It introduces scalability, efficiency and flexibility to the dynamically priced 
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network, especially for real time charging and pricing, where the network utilization levels keep 
changing. 
The drivers of policy management are based on some factors which have spurred 
investments in next generation OSS and billing systems over recent years. These market shifts 
also apply to the policy management level as operators look for capabilities that enable their new 
services and new business models. Next generation policy management solution can support a 
number of capabilities that are critical to the next generation services, including the following; 
Convergence, IP-based services, Service differentiation, Customer care and marketing 
opportunities, third-party content and partner support, network/service resource management to 
mention a few [11]. 
The next generation RATs are expected to operate efficiently amid the complexities 
presented by the HWN features. In this context, the operators must strategically adopt a highly 
intelligent network functionality to manage the radio resources.  The word thrown around 
recently for such sophistication is the self-organizing networks (SON). This is considered as a 
driver to achieve reduction in complexity, cost of network management, cost of operation and 
improved interoperability [14]. It is envisioned that SON functionalities will become 
commercially available with the operation of the 4G networks.    
2.4 Reinforcement learning algorithm 
Reinforcement learning (RL) is an aspect of machine learning which entails an ‘agent’ 
taking some actions in an environment to yield some expected reward. The RL enables the agent 
to learn some set of policy, aimed at maximizing the total associated reward. There are various 
methods and algorithms for policy evaluation in literature, such as iterative policy evaluation, 
value iteration and linear programming (Q-learning). For this research, the Q-learning algorithm 
was chosen after evaluating the pros and cons of the three types of reinforcement algorithms 
mentioned above. Table 2.2 shows the pros and cons of the algorithms mentioned which led to 
the choice of Q-learning algorithm for this research. 
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Table 2-2: Pros and cons of policy evaluation algorithms 
ALGORITHM PROS CONS 
Value Iteration Simple to execute if true value 
of each state is known 
Gives outcome of values of 
each state (instead of policy) 
which is not our goal. 
Policy Iteration Works well in determining 
optimal policy 
A great deal of knowledge of 
the environment is required, 
which might not be at our 
disposal 
*Q-Learning A ‘model-free’ learning, 
combines learning and 
execution, simultaneously in 
any given environment having 
states and possible actions 
Due to learning and update 
process, same states may be 
visited several times before 
finally obtaining an optimal 
policy 
 
The major highlight of choosing the Q-learning technique instead of any of the other 
technique is because of the dynamics of the HWN considered. Information about the HWN is not 
readily available. Also, bearing in mind that, the HWN comprising RATs with different 
capacities and capabilities are individually accessed by users. This makes it a highly dynamic 
system Therefore, the use of Q-learning technique which support learning and execution 
simultaneously is important, to enable the HWN switch between states and actions in an efficient 
way. 
2.5 Joint Call Admission Control (JCAC) Mechanisms 
The heterogeneous feature of NGWN necessitates the Joint Call Admission 
Control (JCAC) mechanism. Heterogeneity creates more sophisticated ideology and 
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approach to utilizing the pool of radio resources available in the network. The 
homogeneous architectures of the Call Admission Control (CAC) is therefore not 
efficient enough to manage the features on the NGWN.  
 Two basic functions of the JCAC are [7]: 
a. Call admission decision and  
b. RAT selection decision  
The basic functions of the JCAC highlighted above can be explained in details as 
follows: 
-  Firstly, determines whether a call request can be admitted into the HWN or 
not,  
- Afterwards decides which of the constituent RATs in the HWN is capable of 
handling the requested call given a performance target which may include, but 
not limited to; access cost, security, data rate, mobility, energy efficiency and 
so on [15]. 
JCAC algorithms are necessary for efficient utilization of radio resources, 
consistent provisioning of QoS across different RATs, overall stability of network, 
enhancement of users’ satisfaction, and increase in operators’ revenue [7].  
2.5.1 Requirements of JCAC Algorithms 
The following are the requirements for an efficient JCAC algorithm for overall benefit of 
users and operators as given in [7]: multi service, efficiency, simplicity, high-execution speed, 
scalability and stability. 
2.6 Quality of Service (QoS) Solutions in NGWN 
The NGWN that transports multimedia traffic creates the need for QoS solutions which 
recognize the requirements of the network to provide different QoS media and subscriber 
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property to the different traffic flow available in the HWN. High bandwidth consuming services 
and applications that run on the HWN require high QoS that results in a high QoE for the 
subscribers, despite the growing traffic volume [16]. Different media types such as video, voice 
and data demand different QoS profiles such as premium, best effort and so on with different 
network operator requirements over different time frames.  
The business models and strategy of operators require modifications that will suit the 
need of subscribers whose demand is ever increasing in the telecommunication market place. The 
approach in [16] suggests ‘QoS differentiation solutions’ that will provide tools that not only 
support the requisite changes, but also allow operators to anticipate upcoming requirements. 
Bearing in mind that each operator and market differs from each other, the need for an operator 
to understand what is relevant will aid profitability and efficiency.  
The benefits and objectives of QoS differentiation depend on the network operator needs. 
Some operator may choose to fulfil different objectives simultaneously while most operators are 
concerned about realizing common benefits such as maintaining high QoS, ensuring efficient use 
of resources, monitoring traffic streams, and flexible support service. Maintaining high QoS is 
particularly important for real-time services and bandwidth intensive services, which requires 
minimal end-to-end delay and jitter while asynchronous applications may require high 
throughput. Monitoring traffic streams allows operators to optimize usage of their network 
resources and capacity upgrades.  
Standards help the mapping of services and applications to QoS profiles or QoS 
markings. However, operators also need to create the mappings that provide the best fit with their 
business strategy. The proposed solutions in [16] are bandwidth limitation solution and 
prioritization solutions, which is explained in the next section. 
2.6.1 Bandwidth Limitation Solutions 
The approach adopted here entails operators’ selection of bandwidth limitations to 
encourage subscribers to use certain applications at congestion times, if the network load can be 
evenly distributed throughout the day, then resources will be used in the most efficient way. In 
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the long run subscribers will have access to a better and cheaper service. Classification of users 
into VIPs and budget users can also enhance the assignment of bit-rates as shown in Figure 2.5. 
Subscribers who require high maximum bit-rates will pay more than those that don’t require 





























Figure 2-5: Bandwidth limitation solutions [16] 
2.6.2 Prioritization Solutions  
Prioritization entails operators grouping subscribers into categories and assigning 
specified price tags for services requested. Some services and applications can even be 
categorized by time of use, for example applications that place heavy load on the network such as 
point-to-point (P2P) can be priced in a way that they are only used at night. Figure 2.5 above 
describes the prioritization of users, having VIP and budget users. Figure 2.6 shows QoS 
differentiation strategies for subscribers, applications and service providers having Service Level 










































Figure 2-6: QoS differentiation strategies [16] 
A subset of prioritization is the subscriber segmentation. Important subscribers such as 
enterprises and large organizations will have the most demanding requirements.  The basis of 
subscriber segmentation is to be able to charge a premium price for premium services. Operators 
can also follow the traffic volumes and throughputs of subscribers segments using the QoS 
specific performance counters in the access network elements. Subscribers’ segmentation 
scenarios will normally be used in markets where there are high-income differences between 
consumers [13]. Charging of segmented subscribers may differ, where a segment of subscribers 
charged based on volume and other charged on a flat rate basis - the volume based subscribers 
should have a higher priority.    
The scarce network resources requires an optimal management which can be realized by 
application and service differentiation. Non real-time applications tolerate much longer delays 
than the real-time applications, prioritization of the real time packets can therefore be efficient 
when there is congestion [13]. Application differentiation enables monitoring of applications as 
they flow along the network. Consequently, operators achieve high revenue through the creation 
of these platforms that make customers see better application performance that benefits them.  
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2.6.3 Technical Components of QoS Solutions 
The technical components of QoS differentiation as described in [16] comprises of the 
QoS management, QoS control and QoS enforcement. Figure 2.7 shows how the components 
interwork to achieve the QoS goals. The network elements maintain QoS profile specific 
counters and send them to the management tools for visualization and additional network 
optimization. QoS control refers to the intelligence that maps the subscribers or applications to 
the desired QoS [13]. QoS enforcement refers to the mechanisms that treat the connections or 
flows differently as well as the efficient allocation of network resources. Examples include 
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Figure 2-7: Components of a QoS differentiation solution and their relationships [16] 
It is envisioned that many types of terminals with sophisticated capabilities will emerge, 
running a wide range of applications, which translates to increase in diversity of QoS capabilities. 
Users will download diverse applications to their terminals, making the impact of software 
developers more significant on the QoS capabilities of their applications. An operator may 
choose the following two important measures [13]; 
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- Relying on terminal request on the availability of device with requisite functionality: 
This is achievable if the terminals are operator branded terminals running on operator-
defined applications. The operator is able to control what type of request is being 
made and charge more for higher QoS.  
- Ignoring terminal requests or indicated QoS requirements: This is feasible if the 
operator doesn’t earn higher revenue even if higher QoS is allocated. This applies to a 
strategy based on flat rate charging and this is a typical near-term business model. 
QoS differentiation provides numerous and flexible ways of allocating and managing 
network resources. It is also used to enhance performance-monitoring capabilities. In addition, 
QoS mechanisms can be used to support different pricing scenarios and thereby influencing 
subscribers’ usage and loyalty. Many QoS mechanisms have gone through stages of 
standardization and implementation. However, the need for additional functionality that is 
provided by differentiation solutions will become more relevant as demand for high bandwidth 
consuming services and applications increases the network traffic levels.  
The best solutions can be achieved by developing an efficient operators’ business model 
and strategy. This includes exploring pricing schemes that can be integrated into an optimum 
QoS differentiation solutions, at the long run encouraging the efficient use of resources and 
customers’ satisfaction.     
2.7 Congestion in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks 
In a telecommunication network, there is an assumption that there are infinite numbers of 
subscribers, accessing a finite number of channels. The channels refer to network element that 
enables subscribers get access to radio resources. A new call request that is blocked or handoff 
call dropped, due to unavailability of resource, degrade in quality of service, delay and jitter is an 
indication of congestion in the network. The high demand for access to these channels creates 
congestion in the heterogeneous wireless networks.  
Subscribers still ‘crave’ for more bandwidth consuming services existing on the HWN 
like high quality (HQ) voice and gaming, HD video, real-time video and video streaming. 
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Consequently, demand for capacity increases and congestion occurs in the network. Therefore, 
congestion control in HWN remains an issue. The following subsections examine the effect of 
congestion, methods of congestion control and economic approach for congestion control in 
heterogeneous wireless networks. 
2.7.1 Effect of Congestion in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks 
When the demand for the radio resources supersedes the available capacity, the network 
experiences drawback from optimal operation. This leads to the degradation of quality of services 
guaranteed to the subscribers. Subsequently increasing the call blocking and call dropping 
probabilities, delay and jitter and so on. Operators need to minimize the effect of congestion in 
order to meet QoS requirements of subscribers. 
2.7.2 Methods of Congestion Control in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks 
The effect of congestion on the network is observed by the use of various metrics such as 
call blocking and call dropping probabilities, throughput, end-to-end delay or latency, packet loss 
probability etc. Operators’ choice of methods of controlling congestion should ensure 
improvement on the network utilization and profit enhancement. The focus of this research is to 
employ dynamic pricing to control congestion, while enhancing operators and users’ utility.  
2.7.3 Economic Approach for Congestion Control 
From the ongoing review, the focal point of the discussion is utility, both users and 
operators envisage satisfaction monetarily, even as radio resources are utilized. Economic factors 
therefore play a major role in obtaining this satisfaction. From the ongoing deductions, an 
economic approach to control congestion is adopted in this research. It suggests an external 
control of congestion rather than on the network elements, by introducing incentives into the 
usage of radio resources. Network subscribers differ in terms of age, sex, education and budget, 
therefore their responses to prices, as well as incentives will differ [17]. An economic approach 
from the price point of view, considers the diversity of users’ life style.  The use of demography 
provides valuable information to service providers on the type of service, price and access 
technology to be deployed in any area, in a cost-effective manner. These data may be obtained 
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during the radio network-planning phase. Areas with a high population of educated subscribers 
will be more likely to pay higher for internet access and voice calls, whereas rural areas, which 
have subscribers with low educational level, will prioritize voice services at affordable prices. 
However, a service provider must ensure an economically efficient pricing, which will 
make sure that no single geographical area will have the same type of users. An economically 
efficient pricing scheme will ensure that the majority of users are treated fairly and equally.  An 
assumption of common pool of resources scenario is examined whereby the finite common-pool 
of resources are accessible by any user and users are assumed to be short-termed and ‘profit-
maximizing actors’ [18]. Users of resources always aim to maximize their utilities, which may 
therefore cause some greedy users to hold on to a constrained pool of resource longer than 
necessary, leading to ‘the tragedy of the commons’. An economically efficient scheme in terms 
of resource allocation and price sensitivity model (PSM) is defined as follows: 
a. Economically Efficient Resource Allocation 
For a network to be considered economically efficient in allocation of resources, it must 
not be pareto-efficient. A pareto-efficient system is one with economic equilibrium in which it is 
impossible to change the allocation of resources without improving the lot of one agent at the 
expense of another. In other words, it is a system that makes the service obtained by a participant 
better, but at the detriment of others [19].  The allocation with the best economic efficiency is 
that which when given an allocation, results in a pareto improvement. In technical terms-, a new 
call or handoff call accepted into a resource-constrained network must not violate the service 
commitments made to the already admitted calls (i.e. a granted access of a new call into radio 
resources must not be detrimental to the existing ones). If this condition is met, then a system is 
said to be economically efficient. 
b. The Traditional Price Sensitivity Model (PSM) Approach- The Van Westendorp 
PSM 
PSM provides a trade-off to tackling the effect of pricing challenges in economics and 
aids understanding of customers. The traditional PSM approach asks four price-related questions, 
which are then evaluated as a series of four cumulative distributions, one distribution for each 
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question. The assumptions are that a product (service) has a price demarcation; Let Hp and Lp be 
high price and low price respectively, and an affordable price, Ap, the standard question formats 
can vary, but generally take the following form [20]: 
1. At what price would you consider the product too expensive that you would not consider 
buying it? -too expensive (Ap<<Hp) 
2. At what price would you consider the product to be priced such that you would feel the 
quality could not be very good? -too cheap; Credibility in doubt. (Ap>>Lp) 
3. At what price would you consider the product starting to get expensive, so that it is not 
out of the question but you would have to give some thought to buying it? (Expensive 
high side) (Ap<=Hp) 
4. At what price would you consider the product to be a bargain- a great buy for the money? 
(cheap/good value) (Ap>=Hp) 
The fourth question highlighted above could be proposed as the optimal price for the 
subscriber while question three is close to being the optimal price for the operator. Determining a 
common point between the third and fourth questions helps to combine both user’s and 
operator’s preference in selecting optimal price during congestion. ‘Optimal price’ is like the two 
sides of the same coin- it is the price that enhances both users’ and operators’ utility. The social 
fairness of a network is determined by how much the user’s utility is enhanced [21]. To achieve 
this objective, operators should pay cognizance to subscribers’ response. Network users are the 
major determinant of the revenue generated by service providers. Therefore, a pricing scheme 
that encourages users to make connection request most of the time will yield greater returns on 
revenue. 
The Van-Westendorp PSM (VPSM) highlights the possibility of users having the liberty 
to abandon any system if they feel price is not affordable. Abandoned systems apparently lead to 
wastage of resources and losses on the operator’s revenue, after a prolonged situation, the 
provider may lose loyal subscribers to competitors. As a network provider or operator, the major 
objective is to ensure that network resources are optimally utilized, users’ and operators’ utility is 




2.8 Role of Policy Management in HWN 
Subscribers remain the major reason for the unprecedented advancement in the 
telecommunication industry. Customers are becoming more sophisticated, demanding more from 
their service providers. More competitive pricing, better QoS, wide range of services and more 
applications are on the trend presently, with no end in view. Technology has also adapted to this 
demands, through obvious advances in bandwidth capabilities, evolution of network standards, 
flexibility and robustness in telecommunication software and so on. The interaction between 
subscribers and the network is undergoing a continuous change in methods of approach and 
integration. The changing interaction is responsible for the modifications witnessed so far in 
terms of capability of the network and the requirements of the customer, therein lies the 
innovation in form of new services and a new focus on customer experience.  
The key word- ‘policy management’ becomes critical in achieving an equilibrium 
between the customers’ experience and operators’ revenue. As explained in [11] the service 
providers’ interest in next generation policy management solutions is on the rise, driven by the 
following factors: 
- Demand for convergent services, which is driving interest in convergent Operation 
Support Systems (OSS) and Billing Support Systems (BSS) platforms that support 
multiple networks, services, devices, applications and content, 
- QoS requirements associated with IP-based services, 
- The need for service differentiation in a competitive market, 
- Managing the customer experience and improving customer loyalty, 
- Managing third-party content and applications, 
- Maximizing network and service resources, and so on 
Policy management refers to the systems and processes associated with ensuring that 
various types of network traffic receive the availability and bandwidth as the radio resources are 
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being utilized. Policy management capabilities have enabled network managers to set static rules 
that controls the priority given to traffic based on variables such as time of the day [11]. 
Traditional policy management functions generally fall into the following categories [16]: 
- Traffic shaping: Using local rules on routers to balance network load and 
accommodate service level agreements (SLAs)  
- QoS management: setting rules for the allocation of bandwidth per service 
Figure 2.8 shows the evolution of policy management over the years. Policy management 
has extended beyond service providers sole control, instead, operators are adopting policy 
management solutions that support the new realm of capabilities based on ability to manage 
policy decisions according to dynamic criteria which include subscribers choices. As a result, 
operators are able to create a personalized set of services that optimize customer’s requirements, 
concurrently with the specific type of network that the customer is utilizing, ultimately 
optimizing the QoE of the subscriber. 
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Figure 2-8: The Evolution of Policy Management [11] 
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Over the years policy management has been limited to static network based functions 
such as traffic management or basic QoS. The functions of traditional policy management, such 
as network profile lookup, authentication, and configuration occur at the network layer. This 
network-based approach has a number of limitations which includes; management challenges, 
lack of support for multiple access network types, capability limitations, rules limitations and so 
on.  
A new generation of policy management solutions can address the limitations stated 
above. The policy management solutions ensures transactions are managed at both network and 
at the service layer. As disaggregation increases between the services and the network, policy 
will become an important ‘bridge’ between the network and Information Technology (IT) realms. 
Policy management can adopt same approaches in network realms to the IT realms, thereby 
enabling the operators set policy parameter both at the service and network layer. 
The drivers of policy management are based on some factors which have spurred 
investments in next generation OSS and billing systems over the years. These market shifts also 
apply to the policy management level as operators look for capabilities to make their new 
services and new business models lucrative. Next generation policy management solutions can 
support many capabilities that are of great importance to the next generation services, which 
includes the following; Convergence, IP-based services, Service differentiation, Customer care 
and marketing opportunities, third-party content and partner support, network/service resource 
management to mention a few. The flexibility and scalability feature of a next generation policy 
management system presents creative ways for operators to monetize their network resources and 
as well as their customer value by enabling them to control services on a per-subscriber and per-
service basis 
2.8.1 Key Features and Functionality of Next Generation Policy Management 
System 
The next generation policy management system provides features that are benefiting to 
operators and will highly motivate them to implement these capabilities. Despite pressures to get 
new services up and running as quickly as possible and to reflect on returns of their network and 
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OSS investments, operators must view policy management as a strategic enterprise-wide 
initiative as opposed to a short-term stopgap measure. Policy management decisions are critical 
to the growth of operators, therefore operators must take note of the following important features 
when making those decisions [11]; Centralization, Integration Capabilities, Flexibility, 
Scalability, Standards Compliance. 
Operators keen on growth and profitability must learn how to monetize their asset. Policy 
management is at the forefront of its ability to do so. By effectively integrating network resources 
information at the network layer together with subscriber and service-specific information at the 
IT layer, Openet’s Policy Manager, can enable operators to extract value from every transaction 
that occurs on their network while optimizing the customer experience.  
The telecommunication market has experienced a remarkable shift alongside strategies, 
from business plans to technological advancements as evolution continues. Previous 
disconnected systems are being integrated that continuously transform the OSS and BSS 
environments.  The shifts are discussed in detail below [11]: 
- Deregulation: Deregulation of the telecommunications market has occurred across 
most countries over the last decade. Privatization era is also characterized by this 
deregulation, where the government-owned infrastructures and utilities are sold or 
leased to private firms. The competition introduced by privatization has driven prices 
in the major markets while encouraging operators to maximize their revenue by 
increasing efficiency and lowering their internal costs. This has driven the interest in 
the elimination of inefficient OSS silos that are replaced by integrated solutions. 
- Competition: Fierce competition has emerged due to the prospects of the market 
creating a new breed of players that are interested in the market with the 
diversification of operators providing a ‘cross-breed’ of services. For example 
wireline operators are offering video services over their fiber optics networks, cable 
operators are adding wireless services to their bundles, wireless operators are 
providing high-speed data services via technologies such as Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), and all three categories are seeing 
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new competitors such as Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) and content 
providers edge into their market space as well. The initial response is always a ‘price 
war’, more sophisticated service providers recognize that differentiating the quality 
and range of services offered represents a better value proposition.     
- Network transformation: The network architectures have also experienced some 
major transformation aimed at meeting up with the demand and efficiency. For 
example a service was embedded in the network it operated on, essentially the service 
was the network. This architecture presented a bottle neck in the delivery and creation 
time, and was also expensive. The development of distributed, layered network 
architectures such as IMS (IP Multimedia services) has changed that by separating the 
services from the network and thus replacing this traditional service creation and 
delivery environments with more flexible, real-time service creation capabilities.  
- Usage requirements: As services and application increasingly advance, they also 
become bandwidth-intensive. These new demands on the network are often generated 
by a small subset of users, and operators must either endlessly invest in the network to 
support these users’ requirements or find a way to manage their network usage to 
avoid network resources’ abuse. Examples include the blackberry and smart phones 
users that require an enormous amount of network resources because of the 
applications running on them and their service capabilities.  
- Customer demands:  The subscribers who are the major reason for these shifts, 
always crave for better services from the network operators. Assumptions of the 
reliability of wireless and IP services have changed over the last few years, with 
consumers of these services increasingly expecting the same quality of service as they 
have received from the circuit-switched wireline network. At the same time, 
customers are demanding more personalized services that address their specific needs, 
particularly as end user devices become more sophisticated as mentioned earlier. This 
has driven interest in capabilities such as fixed-mobile convergence, or availability of 
services regardless of device type.  
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2.9 Pricing the Heterogeneous Wireless Network-Operators 
and Users’ Perspective 
In general, operators translate price as an amount charged to meet maintenance cost and 
keeping the network up and running, while users see price as the amount they give in exchange 
for the worth of the network service. Both perspectives can be interpreted as ‘two sides of the 
same coin’ as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the operator can employ pricing to control users’ 
behaviour. The following subsection presents the review of pricing scheme and the benefits of 
integrating dynamic pricing scheme.  
2.9.1 Review of Pricing Schemes 
Pricing schemes (PS) are designed to offer profitable business to the wireless service 
providers (SPs) as well as to create favourable services to subscribers and eventually to get 
charged according to their service usage [21]. Broad classification of the pricing scheme is the 








Figure 2-9: Classification of pricing schemes [13] 
In the flat rate pricing schemes, SPs set price to a session, independently of the network 
conditions, such as the traffic variations, the usage, the capacity, the actual time the user spends 
in the network and type of service. The flat rate pricing schemes are no longer used by SPs 
because it makes little profit and lead to overpriced events. Flat rate pricing schemes present an 
unfair deal to users, because the network operators charge same price regardless of whether their 
QoS requirements are met [13]. In other to overcome these drawbacks inherent in the flat rate 
pricing schemes, the parameter based pricing scheme(s) was proposed. Parameter-based pricing 
presents a fair deal to users, in that users get charged as they utilize the radio resources. It aims to 
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maximize providers’ revenue as they meet the QoS requirement of users, yielding subscribers’ 
satisfaction.  
For the purpose of this research, it is important to explain further classifications of the 
parameter-based pricing schemes. Parameter-based pricing schemes are further classified into 
two groups namely Static and Dynamic pricing schemes. The static pricing scheme sets price in a 
static way whereby subscribers are charged with a predefined price for the service they use, 
despite the variations of the network resources, available bandwidth, and the number of services 
offered or the usage of network resources. Figure 2.10 shows further classification of parameter-









Figure 2-10: Parameter-based pricing schemes’ classification [13] 
Static pricing scheme, like the flat rate pricing scheme creates a level of unfairness to the 
subscribers and it is therefore not suitable in meeting users’ needs or satisfaction. Pricing in a 
static way translates to users being charged whether or not they fully utilize their allocated radio 
resources. The Dynamic Pricing scheme, which is the focus of this work, provides the assurance 
of users’ satisfaction and it varies the price of service according to system utilization. It enables 
SPs to modify and prioritize the mobile subscribers’ services, according to the variation of the 
subscribers networking demands, which lead to profitable business. Sarah K et al in [22], 
explored the effects of flat rate pricing and dynamic pricing, benchmarking the dynamic pricing 
model in comparison to the flat rate pricing, better user utility and improved system performance 
were shown in the results obtained. SPs prefer Dynamic pricing schemes because it adapts easily 
during the interconnection of HWN. In addition, mobile subscribers, through dynamic pricing are 
able to select their preferable Class of Service (CoS) and get charged based on their radio 
resource usage.  
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In scheme [4], a new dynamic pricing scheme that integrates pricing with call admission 
control is presented. The system contains two blocks which are the pricing entity and call 
admission block. The general flowchart diagram for pricing homogeneous networks is shown in 
Figure 2.11. An overview of call admission control process and price evaluation event is 
explained in the flowchart.   
 






















Figure 2-11: General pricing scheme flowchart for homogeneous networks 
 
An efficient pricing scheme is the one capable of setting fair prices of service to 
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subscribers and which ensure the efficient utilization of radio resources. The pricing schemes are 
usually integrated with the conventional call admission control (CAC) schemes [8], to achieve a 
more efficient network. On the other hand, some pricing schemes suggest setting dynamic price 
only during peak period of the day. However, this reduces the operators’ opportunity of 
increasing revenue, because a separate treatment of congestion as a function of time or network 
usage is not efficient in heterogeneous wireless networks. Pricing a network is usual based on 
policy adoption, which differs with service providers. In [21] the dynamic pricing schemes are 
subdivided based on the methods of implementation. Figure 2.12 shows the further subdivisions 





















Figure 2-12: Subdivision of parameter-based pricing schemes’ classification [13] 
The proposed pricing scheme in this work adopts the programmable pricing schemes (a 
subdivision of dynamic pricing scheme). It is a policy based pricing scheme, which sets prices of 
service according to predefined set of rules. The proposed pricing scheme aims at enhancing 
users’ utility thereby introducing the WTP inclusion along with the predefined rules when 
evaluating service price.  
a. Programmable pricing schemes: A programmable dynamic pricing scheme is a software 
based pricing mechanism that provides flexibility to operators to modify price policies 
implemented on the network to meet up with diverse users’ demand and to enhance profit. 
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It introduce scalability, efficiency and flexibility to the dynamically priced network, 
especially for real time charging and pricing, where the network utilization levels keep 
changing. The general mode of operation of a programmable pricing scheme can be 
summarized as follows: 
- Service prices are charged based on calibrated monetary units which are determined 
by prevailing network load, 
- The price of service affects the users response to network utilization, due to users’ 
price sensitivity, users limit consumption of radio resource when the price of 
connection is high and consume more at lower prices, 
- The pool of resources is limited, meaning the number of calls that can be 
accommodated is limited and calls will be dropped or blocked when resources are no 
longer available, 
- An insight is obtained by using a demand model, which determines the arrival rate of 
users, 
- With the prevailing arrival rate, an optimal pricing policy is determined which is 
aimed at enhancing users’ and operators’ utility. 
Network service providers adopt price policies, which enable them to obtain revenue for 
the services provided. Pricing of the network services may differ, though offering same services. 
The pricing algorithms are implemented in the Mobile switching centre of a GSM network, while 
in an Evolved Packet Core (EPC) network, the policy and charging rules function (PCRF) handle 
real-time charging rules and functions for each service in the network. The PCRF is a software 
component (node) where SPs implement a multitude of real-time charging rules/functions for 
each service in the network and IMS or EPC core networks [23]. Rules may differ based on a 
variety of conditions such as customer SLA, time of day, or network conditions. In addition, it 
handles the real-time management of resources, in synchronism with subscribers and 
applications. 
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2.9.2 Benefit of Dynamic Pricing Scheme Integration 
The pricing schemes are advantageous to the seamless operation and efficacy of the 
network. Highlighted below are the two major advantages: 
a. It helps to incentivize users to utilize network resources and increases operator’s revenue. 
b. By incentivizing the users, the network will have just enough number of users to occupy 
the provisioned capacity of the network most of the time, thereby keeping call blocking 
and call dropping rate and probability within the acceptable levels set by regulatory 
bodies.  
In this present era of converging world of networks, the line of demarcation between 
mobile networks and the internet is fast fading. Innovation and price still remain the major 
market movers and will remain a major focus for any provider that anticipates growth and 
maintaining technological lead. 
2.10 Challenges of Users’ Heterogeneity on Dynamic Pricing 
Schemes 
Heterogeneity of users can be viewed in different perspective, in this context, looking at 
users’ heterogeneity in terms of demographics is the focus. Firstly, in terms of income status, 
users of the network have different income and budget, therefore the request for services will 
differ. Wealthy users will not border about the price of the network, because they can afford any 
price at any given time, while low-income earners may not be able to make call request at some 
price levels. An operator inclined towards only one of these categories of users will create what 
is termed the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in economics theory [18], as mentioned earlier. Tragedy 
of the commons is a situation where a market favours only a class of income or budget. Fairness 
of the network is measured by how much an operator is able to price the network service to 
consider a reasonable range of users regardless of their income.  
On another note, users’ heterogeneity may be classified with respect to educational status. 
In rural areas, users may demand for voice call services than data services whereas in the cities 
and institutions, users may pay higher for data services for educational or administrative 
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purposes. Therefore, an operator should have sufficient information about the users while 
allocating prices, due to the inherent heterogeneity of users in term of demographics. Challenges 
due to users’ willingness to pay and operators’ revenue, and call rate (cost) composition are 
briefly discussed in the next subsections. 
2.10.1 Users’ Willingness to Pay (WTP) and Operators’ Revenue 
Several methods of obtaining Willingness to Pay (WTP) data are explained in literature, 
with inherent flaws and advantages. Willingness to pay estimation helps to determine a suitable 
price for the enhancement of revenue on any given good or service.   
The approach adopted for obtaining WTP in this research is the revealed preference 
obtained from market data. Revealed preference based on historical market data presents 
generally reliable results. Other methods of obtaining WTP such as the use of surveys will be 
tedious and often limited in the HWN scenario considered, because real purchasing behaviour 
may not translate into accurate valuations recorded in the surveys by subscribers. Figure 2.9 gives 























Figure 2-13: Methods of measuring WTP 
Figure 2.13 shows the classification of methods used for measuring WTP. Revealed 
preference, obtained from historical market data of subscribers’ response to congestion price 
updates will enable operators to know the true valuation of services on the network. Revealed 
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preference studies the past action of individuals, and can give current market equilibrium [25]. 
On the other hand, WTP values can vary with geographical location and individual budget. Some 
areas may have high WTP than others, thereby creating better opportunity for the providers to 
maximize profit. Therefore, the service providers’ knowledge of users’ WTP can enhance their 
revenue.   
Modelling WTP in this scenario will be dependent on the historical responses of users to 
previously broadcasted or updated service price. Results that are more accurate are obtained 
because this will reveal the true preference of users during congestion periods. It is worth noting 
that, obtaining WTP through surveys may be inappropriate, because of users’ heterogeneity and 
diverse user preferences. Furthermore, if users document how much they truly value a service on 
a survey, it does not directly translate into real purchasing power or behaviour. The WTP differs 
according to users’ importance attached to the class of service demanded. While some users can 
pay high amount for voice calls, others will rather pay higher for data services. At this point, it 
was observed that there is need for the network to be able to make appropriate and intelligent 
adjustments to an uncertain and dynamic network environment.    
The effect of users’ willingness to pay on call rates has not received much attention 
recently. The features of an oligopolistic market can describe the telecommunications market. An 
oligopolistic market describes a scenario where few sellers sell to many buyers. The sellers here 
represent the network operators while buyers are the users. This creates a competitive platform 
between operators where the operator that offer more affordable prices have more users. An 
intelligent marketing strategy for an operator will be to consider what users perceive about rate of 
calls in comparison to their competitors. Price sensitivity plays an important role in the revenue 
maximization of operators. Users’ willingness to pay can be inferred from price sensitivity 
function (PSF).  
2.10.2 Call Rate (cost) Composition 
The rate charged by an operator for any call request is aimed at covering the cost of 
making the network available and running. The expenses of providing a telecommunication 
service can be broadly classified into capital costs and operating expenses. The capital cost 
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includes all cost incurred in building telecommunication sites and installing them with equipment 
and the operating cost include staff salaries, maintenance cost on equipment and the power 
consumed.  The term ‘always connected’ has cost implications which have to be covered by the 
users of the network.  
The call cost composition for this research can be summarized in the following three 
points; call termination rate, license fees/renewal and maintenance cost. 
a. Call termination rate: this is the rate charged by a telecommunication operators for 
terminating another operators’ call on its network. The rate may differ between two 
operators due to regulatory body’s involvement.  It forms part of the cost of providing 
access to a subscriber. There are three models for charging this tariff [26], they are; 
call party pays (CPP), bill and keep (BAK, peering), and receiving party pays (RPP). 
Therefore termination rates form part of the call rate composition.  
b. License fees/renewal: licensing fees are fees paid to regulatory bodies that issue 
frequency spectrum to operators. The frequency spectrum is leased to the operator, in 
many cases over a period of time, after which a renewal is mandatory. Regulatory 
bodies reserve the right to duration, term and conditions of any frequency spectrum 
license. The lease is usually paid for by the operators, therefore operators need to 
cover up this cost as well. 
c. Maintenance cost: this includes, but not limited to cost of keeping the 
telecommunication equipment functional, staff payments, and so on.  
The highlighted call cost may differ significantly within operators due to adoption of 
different pricing schemes that result in different user response. As a result operators do not 
have an even profit or revenue maximization. Therefore operators should be sensitive to 




2.11 Related Works on Congestion Control in HWN 
In literature, some authors have considered integrating pricing scheme into the CRRM to 
enhance the efficient utilization of radio resources. Others have focused on using dynamic 
pricing approach to control congestion. Congestion in the network can be minimized by 
introducing an incentive to ensure that users limit their consumption of radio resources. The price 
in this context is the incentive that will be determined by the prevailing network load.  
In [8], B. Al-Manthari et al propose a call admission control-based dynamic pricing 
scheme that aims at preventing congestion and maximizing the utilization of resources in 
wireless access systems. The price algorithm dynamically compute the price of units of 
bandwidth, forcing actual number of connection to optimal ones based on network load only, 
with little consideration on users’ preference. 
In [27], Feng Chen et al presents a ‘contract binded call admission control’ (CBCAC) 
pricing scheme, which calculates the optimal arrival rates and limits the number of calls 
admitted. The pricing scheme adjusts price of connection only at high utilization levels. 
However, it is worthwhile to ensure the network is able to encourage users to make calls also at 
low utilization levels. The price algorithm can be improved upon to make price adjustments at 
any utilization level of the network.  
Scheme [28], R. Piqueras et al propose a dynamic pricing for decentralized RAT 
selection in heterogeneous scenario. They suggest that whenever the load in one RAT exceeds 
certain threshold, another substitutive RAT is made more attractive to users by means of the 
offered price. The price algorithm did not consider incentivising users to make calls at low 
utilization levels.  
From the foregoing literature, the collaborative mechanism, which presents social fairness 
and promising efficient network utilization, by the integrating the users’ and operators’ 
preferences, has not gotten much attention in the research community. This research focuses on 
extrinsic control of congestion, which is based on efficiently incentivising end users to limit or 
increase their consumption of radio resources. This is possible due to the sensitivity of users to 
price changes. This method of controlling congestion reduces cost and enables providers to 
generate higher revenues.  
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Pricing the network has a direct effect on users, therefore there is the need to examine the 
behaviour models of network users, which may yield different user response and price sensitivity. 
Table 2.3 shows the literature reviewed with the user behaviour model adopted. The table 
highlights the two major user behaviour models commonly used in literature when examining 
users’ response to price.  
Table 2-3: Reviewed literature on pricing, user behavior model and pricing scheme adopted 










































Roger Piqueras et al in [28], explains the two basic models to be considered when 
including pricing concepts in RAT selection problems, which are utility model. Utility models 
define utility functions, and a usage-based pricing model, which explains the application of 
pricing model to the RAT selection in HWN scenario. Users’ behaviour model can be examined 
by either utility function or demand function, for this research, we adopt the utility function as 
users utilize the radio resource. Utility function relates to the maximum price a user is willing to 
pay for using the radio resources or for a specified QoS.  
The contributions of this work are to employ a collaborative dynamic pricing approach 
that dynamically prices the HWN, driving its utilization to a goal state through price incentives. 
Furthermore, using Q-learning method illustrate how the price entity can reach an optimal price 
policy at every utilization state of the HWN by adopting a ‘reward-driven’ price policy. 
Consequently, controlling congestion and enhancing both users’ and operators’ utilities in a 
Heterogeneous Wireless Network. 
2.12 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an overview of HWN and radio resource management schemes in 
NGWNs. The collaborative decision making which is the focus of this research was then 
explained in view of the global vision of radio resource management.  The reinforcement 
learning algorithm was explained with reasons for choosing the Q-learning techniques among 
others. Highlights of congestion issue and methods of controlling congestion in HWN in the 
literature was presented. Pricing schemes were also investigated and emphasis was placed on the 
control of congestion using dynamic pricing. The challenges of users’ heterogeneity on dynamic 
pricing scheme and the effect of users’ willingness to pay on operators’ revenue was equally 
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examined. This chapter then concluded by presenting the shortcomings of related works and then 


















3 PROPOSED SCHEME AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter gives details of the proposed scheme for addressing congestion problems in 
HWN.  
 Subscribers respond to price changes based on different levels of willingness to pay 
(WTP) for services offered by operators. The operators’ knowledge of users’ demographics will 
enhance the proper price adjustments to obtain the optimal price of services. The objective of the 
proposed dynamic pricing scheme is in two folds, firstly to control congestion in the HWN and 
secondly to enhance both users’ and operators’ utility in the HWN. Figure 3.1 below gives a 











Figure 3-1: Function of proposed collaborative pricing scheme 
3.1 Heterogeneous Wireless Network Model 
Consider a heterogeneous wireless network consisting of a number of RAT whose radio 
resources are jointly managed. The individual RATs making up the heterogeneous network 
support multiple services such as voice, video, data and so on. The percentage demand of the 
radio resources determines the utilization condition of the network. The state space of the HWN 
comprises of the total participating RAT and services available on the RATs.   
Let m denote the total number of RATs, and k the total number of services, the state space 
is denoted by vector z, can be written as follows [5]: 
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ijp  is the number of ongoing new calls and ijq  is ongoing handoff calls, in RAT-i with 
service class-j respectively. We also adopt the bandwidth reservation policy described in [5] 
which prioritize handoff calls, by reserving a portion of bandwidth for handoff calls. Therefore, 
new calls will be rejected upon reaching a certain threshold. The threshold for new calls in RAT-i 
is denoted as pT and the threshold for handoff calls in RAT-i is denoted as qT . Let the total 
capacity of the HWN be the summation of the individual RATs capacity, expressed as follows; 
                                  mkm CCCC =+++ ....21        (3.2) 
Expressing the admissible state, AΩ  in the HWN (that will ensure non-violation of QoS 
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jb  is the basic bandwidth unit, (bbu) needed to make a call of service class-j. The basic 
bandwidth unit (bbu) of each class of service differs; that is, in the network, classes of ongoing 
calls may have different bandwidth. When the sum of the bbu of the class of service in the 
network equals the total capacity of the network, then incoming calls (either new or handoff 
calls) will be denied access. In addition, if none of the RATs have enough bbu to accommodate 
the requested class of call, then the call is blocked. An operator ensures that blocking or dropping 
probabilities are at acceptable levels.  
3.2 Heterogeneous Wireless Network Utilization States 
Four network utilization states, based on demand for service are considered for this 
research, they are underutilization state (S1), fairly utilized state (S2), goal state (S3) and 
congestion state (S4). The ‘states’ show the level of demand on the total capacity, mkC  of the 
HWN, therefore, the following equations describe the network utilization states; 
)( 11 bdSaS ≤≤=      (3.4) 
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)( 22 ddScS ≤≤=       (3.5) 
)( 33 fdSeS ≤≤=      (3.6) 
)( 44 hdSgS ≤≤=      (3.7) 
 
Where ‘a’, ’b’, ‘c’, ‘d’, ‘e’, ‘f’, and ‘h’ are demarcations on demand levels, which can 
assume fixed percentage values of the total capacity. The demand level in a given state, S is 
denoted as ‘dS’. The equation (3.4) represents the underutilized state where demand is very low, 
equation (3.5) describes the radio resources is fairly utilized, equation (3.6) represents the goal 
state utilization and (3.7) represents the network congestion state, where prices are highest. 
3.3 Model of Users’ Willingness to Pay 
In [29] the widely used Weibull-distribution was employed to model WTP values, with 
mean exponential demand function and shape. In this research we employ the demand function 










eW                                          (3.8) 
Where P(t) is the price of access at time t, and P(0) is the previously observed price. )(tW  
indicates the percentage of users that are willing to pay for the new price at time t. Furthermore, 
the WTP values will vary based on the different prices of service charged at different utilization 
levels.  
The scheme in [8] set price that ensure users have sufficient WTP according to the 
demand model used. In this research, the price of services at different utilization levels are 
therefore assumed on a rating scale so as to have 95%, 85%, 65% and 25% of users having 
sufficient WTP when utilization level is at S1, S2, S3 and S4 respectively [12].   
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3.4 Flowchart diagram for the Proposed Dynamic Pricing 
Scheme  
The procedure of the proposed dynamic pricing scheme for a HWN is illustrated in Figure 
3.2 in this section. A feedback loop is introduced for price evaluation which incorporates users’ 
WTP factor in evaluating service price. Figure 3.2 explains the sequence of operation of the 
proposed scheme aimed at enhancing the efficiency of RRM in HWN as explained earlier. 
WTP rating scale
+ Utilization
If there is state transition, 
set new price for service-j 
requested























Try again on resource 
availability, after time t














Select RAT, |Ri| 
with least load in 
HWN
 
Figure 3-2: Proposed scheme for HWN 
As shown in Figure 3.2 the proposed scheme consists of Resource (information) 
monitoring, Decision making and Decision Enforcement [6].   The fundamental basis for global 
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vision of resource management is optimization, which can be achieved through the intelligent 
feedback system analysis.  The proposed scheme introduces this feedback by monitoring the 
response of users as the price of service changes. This yields the aggregate WTP which is then 
incorporated for the service price evaluation. Therefore, the price of access is evaluated not based 
on network utilization only, but also on WTP of users. Consequently, the network is able to make 
improved price adjustments from the inputs obtained and the optimal price of service that is 
achieved enhances both users’ utility and providers’ revenue.  
Users are price sensitive, therefore the service price of a network will determine users’ 
preference among competing service providers. Users’ willingness to pay is also affected when 
users perceive that one service provider enhances their utility than the other. Consequently, the 
provider that gives cognizance to users’ willingness to pay will achieve an enhancement of 
revenue.   Users will pay for a service only if the price of the service enhances their utility and 
will not pay otherwise. Therefore, a provider should ensure an economically efficient network 
that incorporates users’ WTP when evaluating the network congestion price.  
3.4.1 RAT Selection Algorithm for HWN 
The proposed scheme incorporates RAT selection algorithm, which checks congestion 
level based on percentage demand (utilization) and the state of the HWN before proceeding to 
evaluate service price.  The flowchart in Figure 3.2 elaborates the RAT selection algorithm and 
verification of the utilization levels in the HWN. The network utilization levels are calibrated 
into different percentage demand on the total capacity of the HWN. RAT preference in HWN is 
based on least loaded RAT, i.e. the least loaded RAT is selected first [31]. 
The price entity evaluates the service price of the class of call requested based on utilization 
and WTP value of users. The RL algorithm uses the reward values of each state to estimate the 
optimal price policy. The WTP values are adjusted for price to be within maximum price (pmax) 




3.5 Reinforcement Learning Analysis for a HWN 
Reinforcement learning is a process of acquiring information and making improved 
decisions about the states and actions in a ‘system’. In this dissertation the system corresponds to 
a heterogeneous wireless network. The acquired information is used to improve on the system’s 
response which is aimed at achieving an optimal reward value based on past experience. The 
learning process involves learning through experience and in the process learning actions that 
yield the highest desired reward over time. Apparently, the actions do not only affect the 
immediate reward but the total collective reward, which is a cumulative of each reward being 
considered as the action process iterates. One of the major features of the reinforcement learning 
is that it explicitly considers the whole problem of a goal-directed agent interacting with an 








Figure 3-3: Basic Reinforcement Learning illustration 
The ‘agent’ (or decision maker, used interchangeably) hereafter refers to the price entity 
that executes the price policy decisions. The network state is controlled by the action taken by the 
agent and the reward obtained is fed back into the system for proper optimal adjustments. The 
Markov decision process (MDP) helps to further give clarity on the implementation of the 
reinforcement learning process. 
3.5.1 Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) Analysis 
MDPs are a way to model sequential decision making under uncertain or dynamic 
environments. To effectively implement the reinforcement learning into the HWN, the network 
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needs to be modelled using a MDP. The purpose of employing a MDP is to find a policy for the 
decision maker. The decision maker will be able to make optimized decision regarding network 
utilization and WTP values of users for the purpose of enhancing users’ and operators’ utility. 
The objective of the MDP is to find a policy that maps states to the set of actions that will 
optimize the network utilization. This is achieved by maximizing expected rewards or 
minimizing costs associated with the network.   
Preliminaries for MDP are defined as follows as given in [33]; 
- MDP can be represented by a tuple- {S, A, R, P}, where S and A denotes a finite set 
of states and actions respectively.     
- P : S×A×S → [0, 1], denotes the transition function 
- P ( s , a , S ′ ) gives the probability of reaching state S ′  after executing action a  when 
initially in state, S . 
- R: S×A×S is the reward function, R ( s , a , S ′ ) gives the immediate reward for the 
transition ( s , a , S ′ ) 
Real world environments are usually non-deterministic in nature. Therefore the transition 
function can take a state, s  as input, action, a  and a next state, S ′  and give a feedback of the 
probability of reaching the next state after taking the action, a . The Markov environment is one 
which is non-deterministic. Historical occurrence may affect the outcome of future states. 
Therefore, a non-deterministic environment such as the telecommunications resource utilization 
can be described by a Markov environment. Transition of states is based on historical utilization 
of radio resources and price: i.e. the probability of reaching a state may be based on the previous 
states reached. For this research four different radio resource utilization states - ],,,[ 4321 SSSS , 
are considered, where 3S is our ‘goal state’. Figure 3.4 shows the parameters relevant to 









Figure 3-4: MDP evaluation parameters 
The models and factors to be considered in a MDP are explained as follows: 
• States ( s ): The states represent the current/present state ( s ), of the HWN, can be 
congested or underutilized. Each state has an associated reward.   
• Actions (A): The set of actions are the set of executable decisions in any present state 
( s ), which if taken, will result in a next state ( S ′ ) or remain in the previous state. 
• Transition model (T( s , a , S ′ ))The transition model has a Markov characteristics 
which is probabilistic.  Transition to another future state (or next state) is only 
dependent on current state and not past states. Transition occurs in an event of call 
arrival or departure that leads to a change of state.  
• Cost model (C ( s , a , S ′ ))The cost model is also has a Markov characteristic, in that 
each state has a unique associated cost.  
• Reward model (R): In this work, reward is defined as the ‘utility benefit’ derived for 
being in a state, for both users and operators. The total utility is the sum of users’ 
utility and operators’ utility. Therefore, the reward for each state changes as the 
utilization level changes. 
S: a set of states 
A: a set of actions 
T(s, a, S ′ ):probabilistic transition model 
C (s, a, S ′ ): cost model 
R: reward model 
G: set of goals 
S0: start state 
γ : learning parameter 




• Goals: The outlined goals in this research is to obtain action and states that yields 
reward that will enhance both users’ and operators’ utility. The ‘goal state’ is 
therefore the state that achieves the maximum reward for both user and operator.  
• Start state: The start state refers to the state of the network the MDP begins with. 
• Learning parameter (γ ): The learning parameter explains how fast or slow a reward is 
considered and chosen as the best for the current state. Its value usually lies within 0 
and 1 ( 10 <≤γ ). 
• Discount factor (α): Finite horizon problems of this nature will employ discount 
factors to keep total reward and costs of the network finite. It also ensures that a 
higher present reward is better to be chosen immediately, than an uncertain future 
reward which is envisaged to be higher.  
Given a set of optimal criterion, the goal of decision making is to find an optimal 
behavior to suit the criterion. Under this set of optimal criterion it is pertinent in this work to find 
a policy that maximizes the expected total reward value.  
3.5.2 Q-Learning Model and Analysis for the Proposed Pricing Scheme  
As highlighted earlier, Q-Learning is a form of Reinforcement Learning (RL) that 
combines learning and execution concurrently. It works as follows [34]; 
- An estimated value called Q-value is assigned to each state. 
- On visiting a state, a reward is obtained which is used to update the estimate of that 
state. 
- Iterative visit of states is done because rewards obtained might be stochastic. 
- Q-value can be written as [35]   
)),(max.(),(),( aSQarasQasQ ′++← γα                  (3.9) 
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 Learning process can take time because of the possibility of choosing wrong actions that 
yield low rewards (some literature refer to low rewards as ‘punishments’). Early stage of learning 
is important for exploring the outcome of unknown actions, due to the uncertainty of the 
environment.  On the other hand, any error made early will enable the network learn the best 
reward in ample time, and continue to make better decisions onwards.  
To employ the Q-learning algorithm, total system states (S), actions (A) and associated 
reward (R) for the HWN are explained and modelled as follows;  
a. States: The call requests/arrival (demand) can be used to describe the utilization level or 
the load in the HWN. As stated initially, we have four utilization states )( Ss∈ , 
determined by the arrival and departure of calls resulting from a price update event.  
b. Actions: When a call arrives, a given action is executed based on inputs obtained from 
the current state of the network. The actions that can be taken are represented in 
numerical values [36]. The values 0 means reject the call ( 1a ); 1 means accept the call 
and adjust service price ( 2a ); 2 accept the call without price adjustment ( 3a ); 3 departure 
of a call with price adjustment ( 4a ); 4 means departure of a call without price adjustment 
( 5a ). The action space, ΦA  is given as;    
],,,,[ 54321 aaaaaA =Φ                                           (3.10) 



















An adjustment in service prices, that is actions a2 and a4, only occurs when the state of 
utilization changes. The prices of service are not adjusted when utilization is still within a 
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specific state (actions a3 and a5). Calls are assumed to be rejected only when resources are not 
available (action a1- call rejection), which is possible at S4. 
c. Rewards: The rewards are the collaborated utility benefit achieved for both users and 
operator in a given state. In some literature, Willingness to pay (WTP) is used 
interchangeably with utility benefit. Reward values can be generated based on used 
bandwidth, arrival rates, call holding time and access price. Reward values are computed 
based on the percentage utility benefit obtained in each utilization state.    
From the foregoing, a transition from a state s  to S ′occurs in an event of call arrival or 
departure due to previous or recent action taken. The state-action pair gives an associated reward 
value, obtained based on WTP and network utilization, as shown in the flowchart. Furthermore, 
at every state-action pair, there is a dynamic price update event. An episode refers to a call arrival 
or departure and a price update event. The Q-learning therefore enables the price entity to learn 
the behaviour of the system as the episodes continues for a given duration, for example 24 hours 
period.  
For illustration purposes, ten state scenarios are given in Table 3.1: 
Table 3-1: State transition example and price update event 
State transition 
scenario 
Possible action(s) Dynamic Price 
update 
Associated reward 
S1-S1 a2, a3,a5 Ps1 R1 
S1-S2 a2 Ps1+∆P R2 
S2-S1 a4 Ps2-∆P R3 
S2-S2 a2, a3,a4,a5 Ps2 R4 
S2-S3 a2 Ps2+∆P R5 
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S3-S2 a4 Ps3-∆P R6 
S3-S3 a2,a3,a4,a5 Ps3 R7 
S3-S4 a2 Ps3+∆P R8 
S4-S3 a4 Ps4-∆P R9 
S4-S4 a1,a3,a4,a5 Ps4 R10 
   
From table 3.1 the price of service in a given state (Ps1, Ps2, Ps3, and Ps4), changes 
dynamically based on utilization and WTP values (within pmin and pmax). The price ‘∆P’ is the 
unit change in price that is added or subtracted when there is a transition from one state to 
another new state.  
To solve the problem of uncertainty with respect to the state and action pair leading to a 
goal state from a start state, a ‘reward-driven’ price policy needs to be formulated. The policy is 
the set of outlined rules on how the pricing entity should evaluate price based on utility benefits. 
The policy ensures that actions that maximizes utility are taken at each state, leading to the goal 
state. The total reward, TR from a policy can then be formulated as [34]: 
)|( )(
4
1)( πγ sss REUTR ∑ ==                           (3.11) 
It states that the reward from a policy, π  is the sum of the discounted expected utility, EU 
of each state visited by that policy. The optimal policy is then the policy that maximizes this 
equation. The total users’ utility benefit (reward) is measured in terms of the percentage of users 
willing to pay the updated price at each utilization state (WTP(S)), based on a rating scale. 
Operators’ utility is evaluated in terms of network utilization, (REV(S)). The expected reward for 
this research is therefore evaluated with the following equation: 
        )()()( sss REVWTPR +=        (3.12) 
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Therefore, for each state of the network, total reward (TR) is computed as follows:  
sREVWTPTR SSs ∀+= )( )()()( γ                          (3.13) 
3.6 Performance Metrics Considered 
Performance metrics are quantities used to evaluate the efficiency of a proposed 
mechanism. The performance metrics chosen for this research are new call blocking probability, 
handoff call dropping probability, provider’s utility, users’ utility, and network utilization. The 
performance metrics are presented in the following subsections.  
3.6.1 New Call Blocking and Call Dropping Probabilities 
New call blocking and handoff call dropping are measures of determining congestion in 
the network. New call blocking probability and handoff call dropping probability increase as the 
network load increases and vice-versa. During high congestion levels, new calls will not be 
admitted into the network because of limited network resources. Likewise, if the reserved 
bandwidth for the handoff call is exceeded, subsequent handoff calls will be dropped. The 
ongoing calls are the call requests that are currently utilizing radio resources. The ongoing calls, 
both handoff and newly accepted calls determine the current network load condition.  As 
different service class of calls with different basic bandwidth units (bbu) gets admitted into the 
network, the probability of accepting a new call or handoff call request reduces gradually, until a 
call request is blocked or dropped.  
The scheme in [5] employed the steady state solution of the Markov model to obtain new 
call blocking and handoff call dropping probabilities. Traffic intensity of new calls and handoff 
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Hence, the probability of accepting a new call or handoff call into a HWN is determined 
by the availability of resources. The set of states for which new class-j call is blocked in a group 
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Let PBpij and PDqij represent new call blocking probability and handoff call dropping 
probability respectively in the HWN. Therefore, new call and handoff call probability is 










zqij PPD                                                                (3.19) 
Considering the focus of this research, the relevant metric to this study is the new call 
blocking probability and handoff call dropping probability. However, in a pricing scheme 
scenario, handoff calls are only charged at point of admission, therefore handoff calls are not 
affected by congestion prices since they have been charged from the cell where the call was 
initiated [21].  Nonetheless, handoff calls remain relevant to the utilization or load level of the 
HWN under consideration.  
3.6.2 Network Utilization- Arrival and Departure Rate  
Controlling the network utilization for optimum benefit is a major focus. The utilization 
of the network involves the regulation of demand for radio resources and the end benefit 
afterwards. The increase in the network resource utilization, for increasing cost benefits, is 
economically driven. The actual usage of network or class of service demanded is not easily 
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predictable or controllable. The variation in demand over time and space is also a major factor 
that creates ever-changing parameters to be considered in obtaining the actual reasons for the 
network utilization obtained or envisaged [37]. 
Efficient network utilization is crucial to network operators who envisage a good return 
on investment. Inefficient network utilization may lead to over provisioning of radio resources 
that provide unnecessary increase in the cost incurred by operators.  
The methods adopted to regulate the usage of radio resources can lead to either a decline 
or improvement of utilities of both the users and operators. Utilization in terms of arrival and 
departure rate will enable operators to observe the performance of the dynamic pricing scheme. 
Therefore, network utilization is an important metric to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
collaborative dynamic pricing scheme.  
3.6.3 Providers’ Revenue and Users’ Utility Evaluation 
Due to an evolving and unpredictable telecommunication market, all operators continue 
to engage in the price and innovation battle, as they envisage high profit and reduction in 
operational cost. The number of loyal subscribers have a major effect on the profit of operators. 
Therefore, it is important to ensure that the users are offered services and price that enhance their 
QoS and monetary utilities. This will enable achievement of more loyal subscribers as a result 
profit is enhanced. Operators’ knowledge of users’ monetary value (WTP) attached to same 
services offered by their competitors is of paramount importance in setting service price. In 
addition, information of user’s response to network price as the load changes can be obtained by 
historically observing the network usage and users revealed preference, apparently the operators 
can intelligently set service prices for an improved network utilization and profit enhancement.   
Operators do have an expected target of revenue and profit envisaged for every fiscal and 
operation year. The expected revenue is dependent on the number of successful calls admitted 
and the duration of each calls or data volume consumed by subscribers. In chapter two of this 
work, the call rate (cost) composition was explained to give a general overview of the type of 
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cost incurred by operators. The expected number of connection, kjE  in the system is a product of 
traffic intensity and acceptance probability, PAj, given as in [38].  
             iPE Ajijkj ∀= )(ρ                          (3.20) 
Hence, total number of connections for class-j service, TjE is computed as follows: 
)1()1( ijqijijpijTj PDPBE −+−= ρρ .          (3.21) 
Therefore, the expected revenue EjR  is the product of the total number of connections TjE and 
unit price per bandwidth (or per second billing) for the class-j service and the number of 
subscribers making connections [38, 39]. Let jN  be a non-negative integer, which is the number 
of subscribers having sufficient WTP at any given time. Therefore, expected revenue is 
computed as follows: 
jjTjEj NpER ××=                                           (3.22) 
Users as well as operators envisage social fairness as the radio resources is utilized, this 
poses a social welfare optimization situation. In [40], social welfare was defined as the sum of 
users’ and providers’ utility in the system. Selfishness of user or provider does not lead to a 
socially efficient situation.  
Users derive their utility benefit (reward) from their individual WTP values for the 
services requested. WTP values differ with users’ demographics and worth placed on the service 
requested. Users will therefore have varying WTP for same services requested. Users’ monetary 
and QoS utility are a measure of users satisfaction or preference. Deriving from [41], the users’ 
QoS utility (UQi) is measured in terms of the new call blocking probability and hand off call 
probabilities of class of service requested and users’ monetary utility (UMj) is derived from [12]. 








                                 (3.23)     
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Where Pj refers to the QoS metrics that take into account probability of blocking and 
dropping a class-j call in the HWN.  The users’ monetary utility in terms of utilization state and 








)ln( ωβ                                                (3.24) 
Where β is the coefficient of the logarithmic constant, which varies with class of service 
requested and ωj, is a constant for adjusting the offset of UMj [12]. Therefore, ωj is varied 
according to demographics of users and value attached to the requested call. 
3.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter extensively explained the HWN model and utilization states, presented the 
proposed design framework and the approach to modelling users’ WTP using Weibull 
distribution. The flowchart of the proposed scheme was presented along with the RAT selection 
algorithm. The Markov Decision Process (MDP) was used to describe the HWN. The Q-learning 
technique was employed to model the behaviour of the proposed pricing scheme in response to 
network utilization and users’ response to price changes. Possible states and actions that suit the 
description of the HWN and yield an improvement on radio resource utilization was developed. 
This chapter was concluded by presenting the relevant performance metrics such as blocking and 








4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PROPOSED 
DYNAMIC PRICING SCHEME 
The experimental validation of this research is implemented by numerical simulation 
using the MATLAB tool. The MATLAB simulation tool was used to evaluate the scenarios of 
the proposed dynamic pricing schemes. Suitable parameters were carefully chosen to model the 
HWN scenarios examined.  
4.1 Evaluation Framework Overview 
MATLAB enables numerical evaluation of experimental ideas and implementation in an 
easy and comprehensive manner. The block diagram of the proposed framework is given in 
Figure 4.1. 
CALL
 REQUEST Q-learning 
algorithm
PRICE ENTITY






Figure 4-1: Design framework of proposed dynamic pricing scheme 
Figure 4.1 shows how a call request to utilize radio resource in the overall pool of HWN 
goes through the price entity which is integrated with RL algorithm. We assume a fully 
overlapped coverage of the RATs to save installation cost and improve network performance [5, 
42]. The proposed design framework presents an intelligent management of resources using 
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price, for the efficient utilization of radio resources in the HWN pool. The requirements and 
limitation of the evaluation framework are explained as follows.  
4.1.1 Requirements of Evaluation Framework  
Requirements for the proposed framework is a database system that keeps record of 
previous radio resource utilization levels and users’ response to price (WTP aggregate). The price 
entity takes into account that handoff calls are not charged for the variations in price during 
congestion periods, due to the fact that they have been charged in the initial RAT before 
handover occurred. 
The RL framework requires an iterative exploration mechanism implemented on 
MATLAB to obtain sequence of events (state-action pair). The objective is to enable the HWN 
price entity learn an optimal price policy that will incentivize users to increase or reduce request 
for radio resources depending on the HWN states.  
4.1.2 Limitation of Evaluation Framework 
The limitation of the proposed framework is that firstly, it is a numerical simulation, 
which may give room for over estimation of parameters thereby, giving results that are ideal and 
may not be practicable. However, numerical simulation for the framework provides an overview 
of the envisaged improvement of the proposed collaborative dynamic pricing scheme in 
comparison to existing pricing schemes in the control of congestion and enhancement of users’ 
and operators’ utilities in HWN. This limitation may be improved upon when implemented on 
network simulation tools such as the NS2, NS3 and OPNET categories.  
4.2 Congestion Price Evaluation of the Proposed Dynamic 
Pricing Scheme 
To evaluate the equilibrium congestion price, there is a consideration of the demand 
function equation as given in equation (4.1). It is assumed that there exists a price, p which is 
above or below users’ WTP [39]. This price will discourage or encourage just enough users to 
make connection requests at any period. Demand is a function of price, therefore it determines 
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the arrival rate of the subscribers to the network and call holding time. Arrival rate determined by 
a demand function is computed as follows [21]: 
)(
)()()(
)()()( tjtj Ptjtjtj ePf
θσλ −==                                 (4.1) 
        
)(tjλ is a Poisson arrival rate of a subscribers into the HWN demanding service-
j )( kj∈∀ . Where )(tjσ  , is the demand shift constant, and )(tjθ , is the price elasticity of demand 
(the change in demand for a product or service due to change in price) and )(tjP is the price of 
bandwidth for class-j service requested in that time instance. The equation (4.1) above gives a 
representation of users’ call arrival rate, using a demand function. Due to the variance in the QoS 
of service classes and different user behaviour, the price elasticity of demand, )(tjθ and demand 
shift constant, )(tjσ can assume different values at any time of the day [21]. The demand function 
above takes care of these changes. For this research, the demand shift constant is varied 
according to the time of the day, utilization and price. Figure 4.2 shows the price sensitivity 
function of users to price variation, derived from (4.1).   















Figure 4-2: Effect of price variation on arrival rate 
In order to obtain the equilibrium congestion price of services in a network, (considering both 
providers’ and users’ preference), some important measures need to be taken note of. In scheme 
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[39], the optimal price equation evaluated the price with respect to users and operators’ 
preferences. Examining the operator and the user in terms of price (or utility) preference, the 
operator will prefer to choose a price of services to enhance revenue per time in the HWN, and 
on the other hand, the users aim to enhance their QoS utility and monetary utility [12]. Let  )(t∗λ  
be the optimal call arrival rate that suits users’ WTP and operators’ revenue, in a given time. The 
arrival rate, λ* is obtained by varying the demand shift constant, )(tjσ according to the time of the 
day. It is important to note that users may decide not to make connection request in an event of a 
price update greater than their maximum WTP, no matter how good the QoS is [12]. The WTP 
values are also dependent on the service price and the worth a user ascribe to the service 
requested.  
As utilization increases, the price of a service class-j is evaluated as follows: 
jtj pPP ∆±= )0()(                                                              (4.2) 
Where jp∆ is the unit price value added or subtracted, depending on a class-j service, due 
to utilization level (state) of the network, and P(0) is the previously observed price. By 
incorporating WTP of users based on class of service, the price of service class-j, with users’ 
WTP incorporation is therefore calculated as follows: 
jtjtwj WPP ±= )()(                                                            (4.3) 
jW  is the WTP values of Weibull distribution as given in previous chapter.  
Some general limitations can be drawn out from the demand model as explained in [43]: 
the model does not account for users’ ability to anticipate future lower price, suitable to 
maximize their monetary utility. This anticipatory behaviour of users is complex and demand 
will depend on current network utilization state, advertised price and the changes in price 
dynamics over time. The demand level and the current price determine the arrival rate, yielding a 
revenue enhancement strategy. 
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4.3 Price Policy Evaluation in the HWN 
Equilibrium price policy is the price policy that offers the best reward values. As 
aforementioned, reward is the utility benefit derived for being in a state, for both users and 
operators. Users’ utility refer to QoS utility (guarantee) and monetary utility (price), while 
operators’ utility refers to revenue obtained from radio resource utilization. From the general 
economic point of view, the total utility is the sum of user and operators’ surplus, as shown in the 






















Figure 4-3: Demand and Supply curve 
The Total benefit is the sum of user and operators’ benefit. The equilibrium price, PE is the 
price that enhances the utility of both user and the network operator. Table 4.1 gives an example 
of user and operator preferences as utilization changes, and the reward values (r1-r4). Recall that 
total reward, TR(s) is the sum of the percentage of users’ having sufficient WTP (WTP(s)) at each 
state and the network utilization (REV(s)).  
Therefore, the targeted choice of state is state 3, where we assume social fairness is 
adjusted appropriately for both users and operators. At state 3, it can be deduced that users’ and 




Table 4-1: Example of a preference table for users and operators in each state 
 User Operator  










S1 Low Surplus Low Underutilized r1 
S2 Medium Cheap Average Moderate r2 





S4 Very high Expensive Surplus Congestion r4 
 
 The following section describes the RL evaluation and the integration of both users’ and 
operators’ preferences. 
4.3.1  Q-Learning Algorithm Evaluation 
The focus of this research remains the efficient management of the pool of resources in 
the HWN to minimize congestion, with the aim of enhancing both users and operators utilities in 
every state of the network. Y V Kiran et al in [44], proposed an approach for network providers 
to learn the best pricing strategy in the market place using the RL framework. The price entity is 
modelled as an agent learning the best pricing strategy based on the available fixed set of actions 
executable in different HWN utilization states. 
For evaluation purpose, the percentage of demand for service is demarcated in a 
proportional manner, as shown in Table 4.2.  The ‘goal state’ is the desired state (state 3), where 





Table 4-2: Possible Scenario of Demand for service in HWN and associated states 
Percentage Demand for 
service 
Meaning of scenarios 
mkCdSS %)250( 11 ≤≤=  Underutilized state 
mkCdSS %)5026( 22 ≤≤=  Fairly utilized state 
mkCdSS %)8551( 33 ≤≤=  Goal state 
mkCdSS %)10086( 44 ≤≤=  Congestion state 
From the table 4.3, there exists a relationship between the percentage demand and 
threshold capacity of the HWN. Let the threshold for the new and handoff calls in the HWN be 
denoted as Tp and Tq respectively. New calls are only accepted at 86% demand on total capacity 
(Tp ≤ 86% of capacity), while handoff calls are dropped only when percentage demand is at 
100% of total capacity (Tq = 100% of capacity). Figure 4.4 gives an illustration of the 














Figure 4-4: Relationship between capacity threshold and percentage demand demarcation  
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Using a Q-learning technique in this work, a policy for the network price entity is 
determined for the network to make intelligent decisions that will enhance utilization of radio 
resources. The reinforcement learning is employed in this research to enable the network learn 
how to drive the network utilization to the goal state from each state, by choosing a price policy 
that will enhance users’  and operators’ utility for each state-action pair.  
The transition probabilities of the four states considered can be represented in the Figure 
4.5 below. Adopting the first order Markov chain in [45], at a discrete time, the HWN will be at 
one of the four states ],,,[ 4321 SSSS .  
 
S1 S2 S4S3




Figure 4-5: State transition diagram of HWN 
The state probability vector is the probability of being in one of the four states )( Ss∈  










































, ,1  
The probability, Ps, a that a state transition occur, depends on the state-action pair in a call 
arrival or departure event.  The states have different price depending on the utilization of the 
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network, therefore prices are not fixed to a particular state. In Figure 4.5 above, the price change 
is observed as the state of the HWN changes. As a result, the network is dynamically priced as 
the network load changes while considering users’ and operators’ preference.  
 It is noteworthy that the traditional approach of modelling the MDP is dynamic 
programming (DP). Dynamic programming is sufficient enough to give optimal solutions to the 
MDPs. Therefore, obtaining theoretical models for transition probabilities, transition reward and 
transition times often present tedious mathematical approach to real life problems. DP only 
requires the values of these quantities and RL has the potential to solve this MDP problem 
without having to construct theoretical models [36]. 
The total reward value obtained from the learning process differs for each state scenario 
examined in this research. Users rely on their WTP values to enhance their monetary and QoS 
utilities, and on the other hand, the operator will envisage enhancement of revenue, while 
ensuring the efficient use of radio resources. Therefore, we recognize that both parties will 
envisage enhancement of their individual utility.  
For the purpose of evaluation, the Q-value can be written as given in equation 4.9 below 
[34] :  
),(max),(),( aSQaasRasQ ′+= γ                            (4.9) 
Q  is the Q-value assigned to each state,  ),( as is the state-action pair, R is the reward 
obtained for visiting a state and γ  is the learning parameter with a boundary between 0 and 1 
)10( ≤≤ γ , it determines how fast or slow a reward is selected. 
The equation (4.9) says; the value of taking action, a  in state, s  is the reward for the 
state-action pair, plus the product of the learning parameter and the value of the best possible 
state-action pair for the next state, S ′ . States which are not linked directly to goal state is assigned 
a zero value [46]. Therefore, the matrix |R| is the state-action combination with assigned reward 






























Where R1, R2, R3….R10 are the reward values obtained as transition occurs in the HWN. 
When a state is reached, a reward Rn is received, which is then used to update the price. This 
update continues in an iterative manner, until goal state is reached. The Q-values consequently 
show the converged optimal policy learnt after several episodes of the state-action pair.  
The basic Q-learning algorithm is given below: 
Algorithm  Q-learning based on HWN transition states 
Initialize Q(s, a) 
Repeat choosing HWN state randomly 
- Randomly pick s; start state, Ss∈  
- Repeat each step till goal state  
*choose a based on current Q(s, a) using ε-greedy 
*Do a ( Φ∈ Aa ), observe R, next state ( S ′ ) 
*Update Q for all episodes as; 
                  ),(max),(),( aSQaasRasQ ′+← γ  
s= S ′  
 
 
The goal of the algorithm is to goal state is reached most of the time. Meaning the 
algorithm learns from exploration of the states and makes decisions to efficiently incentivize 
users to make use of the radio resources, through a periodic price update.  
 
4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme along with its 
requirements and limitations. The procedure for obtaining an equilibrium price that will enhance 
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users and operators’ utility was also presented. Q-learning algorithm was modelled to obtain a 
price policy that efficiently incentivizes or discourage users to make calls, taking into account 
total reward values at each state. Following the demand function, user behavior analysis and the 
demand and supply curve, a preference table was developed to show a point of surplus of both 
users and operator. Identifying this positions promote social fairness for both parties. As a result, 
we made state 3 the goal state, where both parties are assumed to be treated fairly. By 
examination, state three (3) carefully combines the preferences of users and providers, and thus 
yielded a price policy that would generate a higher total reward value over time. Consequently, a 














5 SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
This section presents the performance of the proposed dynamic pricing scheme, CDPS. 
The performance is evaluated through numerical simulation considering different scenarios when 
CDPS was incorporated and when it was not incorporated.  
5.1 Simulation Parameters Considered for the Proposed 
Scheme Dynamic Pricing Scheme (CDPS), in the HWN 
The performance of the proposed dynamic pricing scheme is evaluated through numerical 
simulation conducted with MATLAB. The HWN scenario considered for this research consists 
of a two RAT that supports three services. The parameters considered are as follows: Capacity 
for RAT_1= 20 and RAT_2 = 30. The three classes of service considered are class1, class 2 and 
class 3, having bbu=1, 2 and 4 respectively. An example of classes of service are file download, 
voice and video for class 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Service rate in RAT 1 and 2 are u1=1 and u2=1 
respectively. The threshold for new calls, Tp is approximately 86% of the total capacity in each 
RAT, and threshold of handoff calls, Tq is 100% of the capacity in each RAT. Network price is 
periodically updated to incentivize or discourage users from making call request at congestion 
periods, as a result users with low WTP may choose to make connections at later periods. Prices 
are set within specified range of maximum and minimum price values. The relevant metrics 
considered are new call blocking and handoff call dropping probabilities, network utilization, 
operators’ revenue and users’ utility are examined. 
5.2 Effect of CDPS on traffic intensity 
Two scenarios are considered in this dissertation. In the first scenario, the prevailing 
network price is updated by incorporating CDPS, and in the second scenario, the price is updated 
without using CDPS. Figure 5.1 shows the traffic intensity for a business day- 24 hours [47, 48]. 
The peak load periods can be seen at 12H00 and 17H00, and low load periods can be seen at late 
hours and early hours of the day i.e. 22H00 till 06H00. Call intensity drops between two peak 
periods as can be seen at 14H00 and later shows an increase.  
 78 
 





















Figure 5-1: Traffic Intensity during a Business Day (24 hours) 
By incorporating CDPS as compared to the scheme in [8], an improvement is achieved as 
shown in Figure 5.2. On the average, the traffic intensity improved, as more users were able to 
make connections because the equilibrium price obtained by the CDPS incorporates users’ 
willingness to pay and demand shift constant. Recall that demand shift constant, )(tijσ changes 
with time of the day. Therefore, demand shift constant for low, medium and high period network 
utilization differed by some constants while evaluating the service price. Consequently, the 
proposed scheme, CDPS efficiently incentivise users to make calls during low load period and 
discouraged users during high load periods.  
 























Traffic Intensity WITHOUT CDPS
Traffic Intensity WITH CDPS
 
Figure 5-2: Traffic Intensity Improvement with CDPS 
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 Figure 5.2 shows that during high demand period (congestion) i.e. 12H00 and 17H00, the 
CDPS discouraged users from making calls, while during the low periods i.e. 22H00-06H00, 
users were incentivised to make call connection.  Result therefore shows congestion control and 
efficient utilization of radio resources.  
 Figure 5.3 shows price updates on class-1 calls, obtained from CDPS by incorporating 
users’ WTP in service price evaluation. The updated price with CDPS indicates an acceptable but 
higher price that enhances users’ and operators’ utility. Higher prices were observed at early and 
late hours of the day (i.e. 00H00-07H00 and 22H00-24H00), while at peak periods, the updated 
price was almost the same for the scheme without CDPS for class-1 service.  



















Updated price of service with CDPS- Class 1
Updated price of service without CDPS- Class 1
 
Figure 5-3: Updated service price for class 1 calls 
Figure 5.4 shows that some updated price are higher than the historically revealed price. 
This means that users had a high WTP at some given time. For example updated service price 
with CDPS shows higher values progressively at 07H00-10H00 and 19H00-22H00, while for 
other periods, service prices was lower or remained the same as previous values.  
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Updated price of service with CDPS- Class 2
Updated price of service without CDPS- Class 2
 
Figure 5-4: Updated service price for class 2 calls 
The updated price for class 3 in Figure 5.5 was same during the early hours of the day and 
adjusted appropriately during other periods. This shows that users had WTP for the updated 
price. The price of service in a network may be over-priced or under-price, as a result, it is 
important to ensure an efficient dynamic pricing scheme that captures the demographics of users. 
CDPS incorporates WTP factor to obtain an equilibrium price that will enhance both users and 
operators’ utilities.  






















Updated price of service with CDPS- Class 3
Updated price of service without CDPS- Class 3
 
Figure 5-5: Updated service price for class 3 calls 
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5.3 Simulation Results Showing Q-Learning Convergence to 
a Price Policy 
In this section, the objective is to present simulation results that show the effect of the Q-
learning on the proposed dynamic pricing scheme for obtaining an equilibrium price policy. The 
parameters for the Q-Learning illustration in the HWN considered are as follows: Learning 
parameter (ɣ) = [0, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8]. HWN utilization states= S1, S2, S3 and S4, goal state= S3. State 
3 is considered the state with highest total reward in the HWN. Episodes = 1440 (episodes of 
either arrival or departure of calls).  
Recall that Reward (R(s)) value is sum of WTP(s) and REV(s), and total reward is the 
product of the reward and learning parameter (ɣ). Due to the sensitivity of users to price changes, 
a rating scale is assumed for WTP(s) values so that 90%, 80%, 75% and 50% of users have 
sufficient willingness to pay when utilization level is at S1, S2, S3 and S4 respectively [12]. In 
the same vein, utilization of the network has a rating scale of  25%, 50%, 85% and 100% for S1, 
S2, S3 and S4 respectively, on the condition that users have sufficient willingness to pay for 
every price update at all utilization levels. The essence of the Q-Learning is to illustrate how the 
HWN can obtain a price policy that takes into account users and operators’ preference in 
evaluating service price. The reward of each state is tabulated as follows: 
 
Table 5-1: Reward value parameter used for calculating total reward (TR(s)) 
Utilization state WTP(s) Network utilization(s) Reward (%)  
S1 95% 25% 120 
S2 85% 50% 135 
S3 65% 85% 150 
S4 25% 100% 125 
 
The total reward (TR(s)) was computed as given in equation (3.13). The best LP value of 
 82 
0.8 was chosen. The ε-greedy method was used to choose the state-action pair for succeeding 
states, based on associated rewards obtained. For further illustration the total reward values and 
transition states are tabulated below. Table 5.2 shows how TR(s) obtained for the ten transition 
state scenario considered:  
















































The table shows an improvement in total reward (TR(S)) as the utilization changes and as 
the learning parameter changes.  
 
Deductions made from the total reward shows that the policy converges at the goal state 
and obtains the highest cumulative total reward, TR(S) values over time, using LP value of 0.8.  
 The Q-Learning learns by running several iterations as the HWN transits from one state to 
the other, while selecting the best available actions. Recall that an episode represents a call 
arrival and/or departure which may be followed by a price update event. Considering a call 
arrival and/or departure every minute into the HWN over a period of 24 hours gives 1440 
episodes in total. Figure 5.6 shows the actual episodes of the Q-Learning algorithm as state 
transition occurs due to arrival and departure of calls. The changes in states (state 1-4) are as a 

















































Figure 5-6: Episodes of state-action pair over a 24-hour period 
In Figure 5.7, the states within the rectangle (state 2 and 3), shows that the network 
obtained a better reward value over time. The two extremes of utilization explained earlier which 
are congestion states (state 4) and underutilized states (state 1) was minimized. Therefore, the 
optimal price policy obtained was able to keep the HWN running optimally most of the time. 
 























Figure 5-7: Episodes showing changes in HWN state for final 100 episodes 
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The Q-learning algorithm shows the total reward values obtained over time converged 
mostly at the goal state and at state two (which can be referred to as the sub-optimal state of the 
network). Therefore, we can deduced that the network incentivised users to utilize the network 
efficiently, by ensuring utilization was at goals state and state two most of the time. The Q-
Learning shows how the network can incorporate a ‘reward-driven’ policy to enhance the 
utilization of the network resources. As a result, both users and operators enhanced their utility.  
5.3.1 Effect of CDPS on Users’ Connection Request  
Using price as the system control vector helps to regulate users demand for connection. 
However, the objective is to obtain a price that will effectively incentivise users, by controlling 
congestion and avoiding resource wastage (underutilization). Therefore, an equilibrium price is 
the price that ensures just enough users are having access to the radio resource in the HWN.    
The arrival rate for the three classes of service considered also show an improvement 
when the CDPS was incorporated for service price evaluation. Figure 5.8, Figure 5.9 and Figure 
5.10 shows proposed dynamic pricing scheme improvement on arrival rate, during peak period 
and low load periods. 
 




















Arrival rate of class 1 calls without CDPS
Arrival rate of class 1 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-8: Arrival rate of class-1 calls with/without CDPS 
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Arrival rate of class 2 calls without CDPS
Arrival rate of class 2 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-9: Arrival rate of class-2 calls with/without CDPS 
The proposed CDPS was able to achieve an improvement on admitting users into the 
HWN. Over an operational period of 24 hours, the proposed scheme shows improved 
performance most of the time, especially during peak load periods (11H00-13H00 and 16h00-
17h00) and low load periods (mainly 22H00-06H00). This means that the users find the price fair 
enough and are satisfied to make call requests as the utilization level of the HWN changes. 
Furthermore, the results show that some users deferred their call request to a later time when an 
affordable price was updated. Some calls were deferred until 14H00 instead of 12H00, also some 
users deferred their calls until 19H00 rather than at 17H00. 





















Arrival rate of class 3 calls without CDPS
Arrival rate of class 3 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-10: Arrival rate of class-3 calls with/without CDPS 
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The proposed scheme shows an improvement in HWN utilization by updating price access that 
reduces arrival rate of users during congestion periods while encouraging more arrival at low 
periods, to reduce wastage of radio resources.   
5.4 Congestion Control of the Proposed Collaborative 
Dynamic Pricing scheme, CDPS 
This section presents the congestion control capability of the proposed collaborative 
dynamic pricing scheme (CDPS). Further investigation on the performance of the proposed 
collaborative mechanism are validated by the QoS guarantee in terms of the call blocking 
probability (PB), call dropping probabilities (PD), and overall resource utilization.  
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the call blocking and call dropping probability of class-1 
connections in the HWN with and without using the proposed CDPS.  

























PB- Class 1 calls without CDPS
PB- Class 1 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-11: Call Blocking Probability on class-1 Calls 
Figure 5.11 shows that CDPS kept blocking probability at less than 0.05 for peak period 
(12H00) and less than 0.2 at 14H00, while the scheme without CDPS showed a high blocking 
probability of 0.25 during the first peak period (12H00). The CDPS shows that users were 
incentivised to make connection, as a result there was more intrusion into the network at 14H00 
and 17H00, however, call blocking probability was kept at low levels than when CDPS was not 
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incorporated. This means more users were incentivised to utilize the network at 14H00 and 
17H00.  

























PD-Class 1 calls without CDPS
PD-Class 1 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-12: Call Dropping Probability on class-1 Calls 
In Figure 5.12, the probability of dropping a class-1 call shows high value at peak period 
(12H00) when CDPS was not incorporated. The overall dropping probability shows an 
improvement, compared to when CDPS was not incorporated.  
Figure 5.13 shows an improvement in call blocking probabilities class-2 calls with the 
incorporation of CDPS. Results show that call blocking probabilities are reduced considerably as 
calls arrive into the HWN network. At high arrival rates, CDPS kept blocking probability 
approximately at 0.25. This goes to show the efficiency of the proposed scheme and that the 
algorithm is running well at high values of demand.   
 88 






















PB-Class 2 calls without CDPS
PB-Class 2 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-13: Call Blocking Probability on class-2 Calls 
Figure 5.13 also shows that users were incentivised to make calls, due to an acceptable 
price update, as a result call blocking surged at 14H00 and 17H00, nevertheless, the proposed 
CDPS kept blocking probability at low levels.   
























PD-Class 2 calls without CDPS
PD-Class 2 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-14: Call Dropping Probability on class-2 Calls 
Figure 5.14 shows that the dropping probability of class-2 calls was improved with the 
CDPS scheme. The CDPS obtained a reduction in dropping probability as observed at the peak 
periods. 
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Figure 5.15 and 5.16 shows the call blocking and dropping probabilities of class-3 calls 
respectively. The CDPS shows an overall improvement in the blocking and dropping probability 
class-3 at the two high peak period (12H00 and 17H00). This shows that CDPS minimized 
congestion in the HWN.   






















PB-Class 3 calls without CDPS
PB-Class 3 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-15: Call Blocking Probability on class-3 Calls 





















PD-Class 3 calls without CDPS
PD-Class 3 calls with CDPS
 
Figure 5-16: Call Dropping Probability on class 3 Calls 
 From the ongoing discussion of the call blocking and call dropping probabilities of the 
three classes of service considered, the following were observed: 
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a. A significant reduction in the blocking probability levels was achieved, illustrating the 
congestion control feature of the proposed dynamic pricing scheme, CDPS. 
b. The QoS utility of the users was enhanced, because the HWN accommodated more users 
and this showed users satisfaction as new service price was updated and as they utilize the 
radio resources.  
5.5 Users’ and Operators’ Utility Enhancement using CDPS  
This section presents the enhancement of users’ and operators’ utility. As described 
earlier, users seek to maximize their QoS and monetary utilities, and operators’ seek the 
maximization of revenue and profit. The operators’ revenue is dependent on how efficient the 
dynamic pricing scheme is able to attract subscribers to utilize the network. Consequently, users’ 
satisfaction enhances the operators’ utility. This scheme tagged CDPS was able to integrate 
users’ preferences and operators’ preference to achieve an overall enhancement of utility. The 
following results shows that users’ utility and providers’ revenue was enhanced effectively 
during congestion periods and over 24 hours business period.  
Figure 5.17 shows the overall QoS utility enhancement of users (UQj). The network load 
and price impacts users’ satisfaction as they utilize the network resources. 





















Users' QoS Utility without CDPS
Users' QoS Utility Enhancement with CDPS
 
Figure 5-17: Overall users’ QoS utility enhancement  
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It can be observed in Figure 5.17 that users’ QoS utility was enhanced at peak periods. At 
some points, a surge can also be observed due to more network intrusion of users as the updated 
price incentivise them to make connections, however the QoS utility did not drop low to the level 
when CDPS was not employed.  
Figure 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20 shows users’ monetary utility (UMj) as users make connection 
request for class-j service and as price changes over a 24-hours business day. As the price of 
access increases with utilization, a drop in users’ monetary utility can be observed, due to users’ 
sensitivity to high service price. However, an improvement was observed with the incorporation 
of CDPS.  





















Users' Monetary Utility without CDPS- Class 1
Users' Monetary Utility with CDPS- Class 1
 
Figure 5-18: Users’ Monetary Utility Enhancement on class-1 Calls 






















Users' Monetary Utility with CDPS- Class 2
Users' Monetary Utility without CDPS- Class 2
 
Figure 5-19: Users’ Monetary Utility Enhancement on class-2 Calls 
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Users' Monetary Utility without CDPS- Class 1
Users' Monetary Utility with CDPS- Class 1
 
Figure 5-20: Users’ Monetary Utility Enhancement on class-3 Calls 
Users’ monetary utility will differ with respect to demographics and level of income. 
Therefore, the results may provide different patterns depending on the environment under 
consideration and demographic distribution of users.  
The operators’ utility is presented in terms of revenue obtained from the demand for 
connection over a period of 24 hours. The number of users able to accept the price of access and 
make connections over every business period determines operators’ revenue. From the example 
given in the table of preference (Table 4.3), the deduction is that operators make more profit at 
congestion periods, if only more users are able to make call requests not minding the high price.  
Figure 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23 shows operators’ revenue enhancement on various classes of 
calls over a 24-hour business period. Higher profits were obtained during congestion periods, 
based on the users that have willingness to pay for access at that time. CDPS shows a significant 
revenue enhancement on revenue obtained on classes of calls considered.  
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Operators' Revenue Enhancement with CDPS-class 1
Operators' Revenue  without CDPS-class 1
 
Figure 5-21: Operators’ Revenue Enhancement on class 1 Calls 
 






















Operators' Revenue Enhancement with CDPS- Class 2
Operators' Revenue without CDPS-Class 2
 
Figure 5-22: Operators' Revenue Enhancement on class 2 Calls 
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Operators' Revenue Enhancement with CDPS-class 3
Operators' Revenue without CDPS-class 3
 
Figure 5-23: Operators' Revenue Enhancement on class 3 Calls 
The overall revenue obtained by operator was enhanced when CDPS was incorporated 
into the HWN. It can be deduced that due to the efficiency of the CDPS the users were satisfied 
by the access price during low and high period which translated to higher revenue for operators. 
This was achieved by the incorporation of the users’ WTP. The Q-learning algorithm was able to 
show that higher total reward values are obtained by a ‘reward-driven’ price policy. As a result, 
users as well as operators enhanced their utilities.  
   
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the numerical result and performance of the proposed 
collaborative mechanism, CDPS. Firstly, the relevant parameter and metrics were outlined. The 
Q-learning algorithm shows that price update converged to a price policy, by showing an 
improvement on the total reward obtained. The price policy enables the price entity to efficiently 
incentivize users to make connections in an event of price changes or update. The effect of 
equilibrium price update on users’ connection request and arrival rate is presented in this chapter. 
The congestion control feature of the proposed collaborative dynamic pricing scheme was 
presented by showing reduction in new call blocking and handoff call dropping probabilities for 
the three classes of service considered. An increased level of utilization showed more network 
intrusion with efficient management of radio resource usage, meaning more users gained access 
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into the network with significantly low blocking and dropping probabilities. This chapter 
concluded with results showing users’ QoS and monetary utility enhancement and operators’ 



















6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research has revealed that congestion control in multi-serviced HWN using dynamic 
pricing is an important area of research that determines profitability of operators in 
heterogeneous wireless networks. Users have been carefully examined as being very important in 
efficient utilization of radio resources, playing an important role in determining the phase of 
transformation as the telecommunication evolution changes rapidly. Uncertainties have being 
observed in terms of the competitive nature of the telecommunications market, and survivability 
of competitors (service providers). It has been discovered that in existing pricing schemes 
developed for congestion control in heterogeneous wireless network, much attention has not been 
given to users’ willingness to pay in determining service price. Therefore, a cost-effective 
scheme known as the Collaborative Dynamic Pricing Scheme (CDPS), has been proposed in this 
dissertation. The scheme effectively reduces congestion and enhances the utility of users and 
operators in heterogeneous wireless networks.  
The proposed collaborative dynamic pricing scheme employs dynamic pricing for 
reducing congestion and increasing utilization in the network. Users’ sensitivity to price has been 
observed from their revealed preferences (willingness to pay) or historical market data. This is 
then used to evaluate equilibrium service price that will minimize congestion and enhance utility. 
Furthermore, a Q-learning technique has been developed for the collaborative dynamic 
pricing scheme. Q-learning algorithm provides an illustration of obtaining a ‘reward-driven’ 
price policy that will minimize congestion and underutilization of the HWN. The network 
therefore develops a price policy that will enable the price entity to choose the best state-action 
pair for any network utilization level. The performance of the proposed scheme has been 
evaluated through numerical simulations conducted in MATLAB.  Numerical simulation results 
show that the proposed collaborative approach reduced network congestion and enhances users 
and operators’ utility.  
More so, numerical results show that the proposed Collaborative Dynamic Pricing Scheme 
(CDPS) controls congestion by reducing new call blocking and handoff call dropping 
probabilities, and enhances the utilities of users and operators. The proposed scheme can enhance 
the competitive edge of a network operator when implemented in a heterogeneous wireless 
network.  
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6.1 Recommendations  
This research recommends that the scheme be realized and implemented on a more 
sophisticated network simulation tool. A prospective radio resource management system, with 
focus on price dynamics has been proposed to providers, to be realized on a functional 
telecommunication network. Furthermore, the heterogeneous scenario considered for this 
research has two RATs. Further work should be looked into to see the effect of increasing 
number of RATs on the performance of the proposed scheme. 
Finally, the users’ WTP values should be computed with other user utility and demand 
functions for better performance and comparison. It is also recommended that users’ 
demographics on network connection requests should be given greater focus to improve on this 













[1] ITU releases, Latest Tech Figures and Global Ranking, 
http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2013/41.aspx, Accessed January 2014. 
[2]  Radio Resource Management in Heterogeneous Networks, http: 
//researchwebshelf.com/uploads/289_T02.pdf. 2005, Accessed September 2013. 
[3] “FOKUS Fraunhofer NGNI, NGN2FI Evolution lab,” Unified Communication 
Laboratory, FUSECO playground, 
http://www.open_mtc.org/about_us/fokus_ngni/index.html, Accessed May 2014. 
[4]  M. Manaffar, H. Bakhshi  and M. Pilevari, “A New Dynamic Pricing Scheme with Call 
Admission Control to Reduce Network Congestion,” in Advanced Information 
Networking and Applications Workshops, AINAW, Okinawa, Japan, March 25-28, 2008, 
pp. 347-352. 
[5] O. E. Falowo and H. A. Chan, “Join Call Admission Control Algorithm to Enhance 
Connection-Level QoS in Heterogeneous Cellular Networks,” AFRICON, Windhoek, 
Namibia, September 26-28, 2007, pp. 1-7.  
[6] K. Piamrat, A. Ksentini, J. Bonnin and C. Viho, “Radio Resource Management in 
Emerging Heterogeneous Wireless Networks,” Computer Communications, vol. 34, no. 
9, June 15, 2011, pp. 1066-1076.  
[7] O. E Falowo and H. A Chan, “Joint Call Admission Control Algorithms: Requirements, 
Approaches, and Design Considerations,” Elsevier Journal: Computer Communications 
vol. 31, no. 6, April 2008, pp. 1200-1217.  
[8] B. Al-Manthari, N. Nasser, N. A. Ali and H. Hassanein, “Congestion Prevention in 
Broadband Wireless Access Systems: An Economic Approach”, in Computers and 
Communications, ISCC, Sousse, Tunisia, July 5-8, 2009, pp. 606-611.  
[9] Y. Feng, B. Li and B. Li, “Price Competition in an Oligopoly Market with Multiple IaaS 
Cloud Providers”, IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 63, no. 1, January 2014, pp. 59-
73. 
[10] B. Zeng, X. Fang and L. Qing, “Utility-Based Dynamic Revenue Pricing Scheme for 
Wireless Operators”, in Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 
IEEE, Shanghai, China, April 7-10, 2013, pp. 4612-4617.  
[11] White paper: “Controlling Subscribers and the Network,” Next Generation Policy 
Management- www.openet.com, Openet telecom, 2010.  
[12] T. O. Kamoto and T. Hayashi, “Analysis of Service Provider's Profit by Modelling 
Customer's Willingness To Pay For IP QoS,” Global Telecommunications Conference 
(GLOBECOM), Taipei, Taiwan, November 17-21, 2002, pp. 1549-1553. 
 99 
[13] C. A. Gizelis and D. D. Vergados, “A Survey of Pricing Schemes in Wireless Networks”, 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 13, no. 1, 2011, pp. 126-145.  
[14] M. Haddad, S. E. Elayoubi, E. Altman and Z. Altman, “A Hybrid Approach for Radio 
Resource Management in Heterogeneous Cognitive Networks”, IEEE Journal on Selected 
Areas in Communications, vol. 29, no. 4, April 2011, pp. 831-842.  
[15] G. H. Carvalho, I. Woungang, A. Anpalagan, M. S. Obaidat and M. M. Rahman, “A Joint 
Call Admission Control-Based Approach for Initial RAT Selection in Hetnets,” in 
Computer, Information and Telecommunication Systems (CITS), Athens, Greece, May 7-
8, 2013, pp. 1-5. 
[16] Nokia Siemens Networks Corporation, “Quality of Service Requirement in Tomorrow's 
Connected World,”- A Technology Guide and Vision, www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com, 
2008.  
[17] M. O. Oduh, M. Ogechi, “Determinants of Willingness to Pay for Mobile 
Telecommunications Services in Nigeria,” Journal of Information Engineering and 
Applications, vol. 2, no. 6, 2012. 
[18] E. Ostrom, “Tragedy of the Commons,” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 
Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008, Accessed June 2010. 
[19] The Concept of Pareto Efficiency, http://pages.uoregon.edu/cjellis/441/441notes.pdf, 
Accessed March 2014.  
[20] “Van Westendorp's Price Sensitivity Meter,” 5 Circle Research, 
http://productcampseattle.org.  Product Camp 2012. 
[21] B. Al-Manthari, N. Nasser and H. Hassanein, “Congestion Pricing in Wireless Cellular 
Networks,” IEEE Journal on Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 13, no. 3, 
September 2011,  pp. 358-371.  
[22] S. Kabahuma and O.E Falowo, “Analysis of Network Operators’ Revenue with A 
Dynamic Pricing Model Based on User Behaviour In NGWN Using JCAC,” Proceedings 
of Southern African Telecommunications Networks and Applications Conference 
(SATNAC), Spier Estate, South Africa, September 5-8, 2010. 
[23] Testing Policy and Charging Functions (PCRF and PCEF), 
http://www.tekcomms.com/successstories/testingpolicyandchargingfunctionspcrfpcef?gcl
id=CJGMrdjY3roCFSrJtAodwRQA6A, Accessed November 2013.  
[24] C. Breitdert, M. Hahsler, and T. Reutterer, “A Review of Methods for Measuring 
Willingness-To-Pay,” Innovative Marketing, vol. 2, 2006.  
 
 100 
[25] “Discrete Choice Modelling”, http://www.tcd.ie/civileng/Staff/Brian.Caulfield/T2%20-
%20Transport%20Modelling/Discrete%20Choice%20Modelling.pdf, Accessed August 
2014,  
[26] Mobile Termination Rates (MTR), Helgi Analytics, 
http://www.helgilibrary.com/indicators/index/mobile-termination-rates-mtr, Accessed 
February 2014.  
[27] F. Chen, R. Ni, X. Qin and G. Wei, “A novel CAC-based network pricing scheme for 
wireless access networks,” Wireless Information Technology and Systems (ICWITS), 
Honolulu HL, US, August 28-September 3, 2010, pp. 1-4. 
[28] R. Piqueras, J. Perez-Romero, O. Salient and R. Agustí, “Dynamic Pricing for 
Decentralised RAT Selection in Heterogeneous Scenarios,” in Personal, Indoor and 
Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC), Helsinki, Finland, September 11-14, 2006, pp. 
1-5.  
[29] Siew-Lee Hew and L. B. White, “Optimal Integrated Call Admission Control and 
Dynamic Pricing with Handoffs and Price-affected Arrivals,” Asia-Pacific Conference on 
Communications, Perth, Western Australia, October 5, 2005, pp. 396-400. 
[30] Jiongkuan Hou, Jie Yang and S. Papavassiliou, “Integration of Pricing with Call 
Admission Control to Meet QoS Requirements in Cellular Networks,” IEEE Transactions 
on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 13, no. 9, September 2002, pp. 898-910.  
[31] O. E. Falowo and H. A. Chan, “Analysis of joint call admission control strategies for 
heterogeneous cellular networks,” 12th IEEE Symposium on Computers and 
Communications, ISCC, Aveiro, Portugal, July 1-4, 2007, pp. 775-780. 
[32] Reinforcement Learning: An introduction, a Bradford Book, The MIT press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, London England, http://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~sutton/book/ebook/the-
book.html,  Accessed April 2014. 
[33] I. Szita, B. Takacs, A. Lorincz, “e-MDPs: Learning in Varying Environments,” Journal of 
Machine Learning Research 3, 2002, pp. 145-174. 
[34] Value Iteration, Policy Iteration and Q-Learning, 
http://uhaweb.hartford.edu/compsci/ccli/projects/QLearning.pdf, Accessed April 2014. 
[35] V. Ricardo Cruz-Álvarez, E. Hidalgo-Peña, Hector-Gabriel Acosta-Mesa, “A Line 
Follower Robot implementation using Lego's Mindstorms Kit and Q-Learning,” Acta 
Universitaria, Universidad de Guanajuato México, vol. 22, 2012, pp. 113-118.  
[36] R. J.M. Silva, Joao C.W.A Costa, G. H.S.A Carvalho, “A Reinforcement Learning Based 
Joint Call Admission Control for Heterogeneous Wireless Networks,” 7th International 
Telecommunication Symposium (ITS), 2010. 
[37] A. Hassidim, D. Raz, M. Segalov and A. Shaqed, “Network utilization: The Flow View,” 
INFOCOM, IEEE Proceedings, Turin, Italy, April 14-19, 2013, pp. 1429-1437.  
 101 
[38] N. J. Keon and G. Anandalingam, “Optimal Pricing for Multiple Services in 
Telecommunications Networks Offering Quality-of-Service Guarantees,” IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on Networking, vol. 11, no. 1, February 2003, pp. 66-80. 
[39]  Q. Wang, J. M Peha, M A. Sirbu, “Optimal Price for Integrated-Services Networks with 
Guaranteed Quality of Service,” Internet Economics, McKnight, L. and Bailey, J. eds., 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997, paper 453. 
[40] J. Estevez, H. G. Xiong, Q. Gao and E. Guerrero, “A Pricing Scheme to Maximize Social 
Welfare in Communication Networks,” Joint Conferences on Pervasive Computing 
(JCPC), Tamsui, Taipei, December 3-5, 2009, pp. 285-288.  
[41] A.  Olivre, “Call Admission Control and Dynamic Pricing in a GSM/GPRS Cellular 
Network,” University of Dublin, Department of Computer Science, September 2004.  
[42] P. Munoz, R. Barco, D. Laselva and P. Mogensen, “Mobility-based strategies for traffic 
steering in heterogeneous networks,” Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 51, no. 5, 
May 2013, pp. 54-62. 
[43] L. Huang and M. J. Neely, “The Optimality of Two Prices: Maximizing Revenue in a 
Stochastic Communication System,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 18, 
no. 2, April 2010, pp. 406-419. 
[44] Y. V. Kiran and R. Giaffreda, “A Dynamic Pricing Method for Efficient Radio Resource 
Management in Wireless Access Networks,” IEEE International Conference on 
Communications (ICC), Kyoto, Japan, June 5-9, 2011, pp. 1-5. 
[45] O. E. Falowo and H. A. Chan, “Effect of Call Dynamics of a Multiservice Multimode 
Terminal on RAT Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks,” Global 
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Anaheim, California, December 3-7, 2012, 
pp. 5249-5253. 
[46] Q-learning by Examples, 
http://people.revoledu.com/kardi/tutorial/ReinforcementLearning/index.html, Accessed 
February 2014. 
[47] A.  Myskja, “An Introduction to Teletraffic,” 
https://www.netlab.tkk.fi/opetus/s383141/kalvot/E_liikenne.pdf, Telektronikk 2/3, 1995, 
pp 3-40. 
[48] R. L Freeman, “Fundamentals of Telecommunication,” Copyright C 1999, Wiley & Sons 
Inc.  
